But there is a huge difference between writing a historical novel and writing history. If I may put it like this: history is like a river, and the historian is writing about the ways the river flows and the currents and crosscurrents in the river. But, within this river, there are also fish, and [...] I am interested in the fish. The novelist’s approach to the past, through the eyes of characters, is substantially different from the approach of the historian. (Kooria, 2012: 718)

Dipesh Chakrabarty notices that to craft their own visions of history—and it might be added that of literature as well—South Asian intellectuals borrow European concepts and categories. Unavoidable and indispensable as such borrowings are for him, they entail both global and regional effect; the effect is global in the sense that the exchange of ideas makes them spread worldwide and regional in the sense that their constant interactions caused one central and universal notion of history to collapse in favor of a multitude of dispersed historical perspectives (Chakrabarty, 2000: 3–6).

An attention-grabbing case of history view that might be juxtaposed with Chakrabarty’s claims is Amitav Ghosh’s idea of river-like history according to which literary and historical writings are unlike. Although theoretically viable when viewed from Chakrabarty’s global perspective—it appears to be a contemporary version of Hegel’s idea of river-like history (Hegel, 1892: 2)—the concept does not seem to acknowledge the achievements of post-positivist historiography and promotes the notion of universal history. The purpose of this study, however, is neither to explore the incompatibility of Chakrabarty and Ghosh’s
ideas, nor to deplore the latter’s thought, but rather to offer an alternative to it. In my understanding, history is like an ocean of events, people, concepts, and objects that interact in their incessant flow. Embedded in it, both the writer and the historian write from the perspective of the fish and about the fish world. As an all-embracing framework, the ocean enables us to treat their writing alike. I intend to justify the thesis by means of an examination of the changes in relations of literature and history, interwoven with arguments pointing to similarities between literary and historical writings.

Whether one ascribes alikeness or dissimilarity to literature and history writing depends on the context in which they are located and the definitions of both elements. From its very beginning up to the eighteenth century, the relation between literature and history was that of the all-encompassing ‘practice of writing’ and a mode of writing about the past. This dependency was the aftermath of the Antique-elaborated perspective on the relation between reality and art. The organizing principle of the world, as outlined in Hesiod’s *Theogony*, were the five ages of man. Orchestrated by divine forces, the fate of humanity was put into the frame of the fall of man from the Golden to the Iron Age (Breisach, 1994: 8). If the reality was conceived as such a frame and, as Aristotle suggests, the imitative arts drew from it, then their understanding was bound to fit in the concept. In *Poetics*, the ‘Arts of Poetry’ are defined as verbal imitations of this reality (Aristotle, 1922: 1) and understood as an umbrella term for all antique oral and writerly products, history included. When Aristotle introduces the distinction between the poet who is to write about what can happen, to devise serious philosophical compositions about universals, and the historian who aims at what has happened in particular situations, this difference does not locate literature and history on two different sides of the barricade. Firstly, if the ‘Arts of Poetry’ is an umbrella term, then the highlighted differences are classificatory ones.

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1 Neither this epoch nor any other in this study is understood as giving on, uniform concept. To admit the complexity of such phenomena I treat each epoch, to use J. Roger’s phrase, as ‘a constellation of ideas and mental attitudes’.
within poetry rather than by and large antithetical. Secondly, the abovementioned set of distinctions—can happen—has happened, general—particular, single action—single period—is questioned by Aristotle himself. It turns out that the poet can write about ‘a historical subject’ and that many writers mixed in their works what could and what has happened (Marincola, 2007: 130), general and particular, actions and periods. Moreover, the argument that poetry is ‘more’ philosophical and serious than history does not make the latter non-philosophical or non-serious (Aristotle, 1922: 1, 35–39, 89). Thus, what we might perceive as either poetic or historical products of the era seem to be informed and unified by the same overarching principle, i.e. being masterpieces of poetry imitating the real.

Hesiod’s and Aristotle’s observations constitute the milestones in the studies on the relation between literature and historiography. Hesiod’s fall-of-man frame reverberated in the European historiography up to the end of the eighteenth century. A consequence of adopting such frame was that history became a preordained series with events, people and objects to be slotted into ready constructs; ‘years to come would bring merely new variations of the old human drama’, notices Ernst Breisach (1994: 22). If the purpose of writing was first of all to imitate the grand ‘fall-of-man’ or progress of humanity story, the need to differentiate between true or false accounts, history and literature might have seemed secondary (Burrow, 2008: 284). That is why the father of history avers that his first and foremost ‘task in the whole logos is to write down what everybody says, as […] [he hears] it’ (Herodotus, 2006: 85). Obviously, his progeny declares that although ‘the first law of historiography is not daring to say anything false, and the second is not refraining from saying anything true: there should be no suggestion of prejudice for, or bias against, when you write […] the actual superstructure consists of content and style’ (Cicero, 2009: 15–16). At the same time, history is to narrate and memorialize and therefore considered ‘a kind of prose poem’ (Gossman, 1990: 227).²

² The role of demonstrating, arguing and persuading is ascribed to forensic rhetoric.
Just as throngs of Greco-Roman historians followed these rules, so did the Christian authors who, however, reworked them after their own fashion. Inasmuch as the latter ones also considered history a branch of grammar or rhetoric (Deliyannis, 2003: 1–3) and borrowed models for their writings from the Greco-Roman works (Breisach, 1994: 82, 85), the world-view framing their narrations was somewhat different and their rhetorical style more modest (Ainsworth, 2003: 265). On the basis of the concept of the ages of man, Christian theoreticians of history—Eusebius, Jerome, St. Augustine, Isidore of Seville, Bede, Thomas Aquinas—formulated their own version of the (hi)story of the fall of the man. For example, in St. Augustine’s *The City of God*, the most fundamental historical periodization of the epoch, we read that there are six ages of the world corresponding to six days of creation; that humanity moves from the period of blissful happiness to the Second Coming which is to bring the seventh age—the Kingdom of Heaven (Grabski, 2003: 60).

A consequence of adopting such frame is that early Christian and medieval history, just like its Greco-Roman equivalent, was a preordained series with events, people and objects to be slotted into typological constructs. Thus, the Christians did not bring about the fall of the Roman Empire (Augustine), the ten plagues of Egypt did not differ much from the ten Roman persecutions (Orosius), saints were heroes, heroic men grand, the prudent wise, the just upright (Henry of Huntingdon), the noble pious (Richard of Devizes).  

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3 Eusebius and Jerome modeled on Castor of Rhodes, Augustine on Cicero, Livy and Seneca.
4 Grabski quotes Böhner and Gilson who aver that: ‘In the Middle Ages historiosophy was shaped mostly by ideas of St. Augustine. History was conceived as a great drama designed by God and with the human as the actor. The frame was given in the Holy Bible. Three great events divide the history: the Creation, the Redemption and the Apocalypse’ (Grabski, 2003: 60).
5 Apart from these remarks of Breisach, see also: ‘[…] the stories of saints acquired some standard features. The saint’s youth was either precociously pious or flawed until a conversion experience changed everything; miracles were performed and hardships endured; and after death the body might remain incorrupt. The similarities did not matter, since these biographies wished to present not innovative stories but the typical manifestations of the holy in this world’ (Breisach, 1994: 86, 98); and ‘They reflected the Christian image
Another corollary, regardless of whether we are talking about Greco-Roman or Christian historiography, is that the question of truth seemed secondary to the aesthetic and didactic purposes of what then was considered historical writing. On the one hand, pre-modern historians lied blatantly; instead of providing a fair account of the past, they aimed at gaining reputation and fame by means of rhetorical shows or succumbed to political or religious pressures and needs. On the other hand, in establishing their own trade, the historians made truth their main banner. By emphasizing the truthfulness of their accounts, not only did they try to ensure the place of history among the-world-functioning explanatory measures—history was to pass the divine truths—but also pressed historiography’s separation from literature.

of the cosmos with its spiritual unity and hierarchy of all things and events. God’s decree governed all and it was for the most part mysterious. In such a world the records of events, besides telling of what happened, contained divine messages for human beings. An earthquake or a swarm of locusts warned people, a vision evoked hope, and the fate of an individual provided a lesson (Breisach, 1994: 102); as well as ‘In these chansons less was said about the piety of nobles than about their deeds, characters, motives, and loves, and truth was not what actually happened but a mixture of the actual, the ideal, and the imagined. Typically, a real figure of history was transformed into a heroic figure by the addition of fictitious elements, for example, El Cid or Roland. […] Henry II’s successor, Richard I, the Lionheart, provided an ideal subject for a heroic history and not only because of his adventures during the Third Crusade. In his Chronicle of the Time of Richard I, Richard of Devizes turned all of Richard’s rule into a sort of chanson de geste. The king was a shining hero, while his opponents, especially Philip Augustus, were villains with souls darker than a moonless night. When the forces of darkness and of light confronted each other, dramatic battles were fought with lances and arrows traversing the sky, shields clashing, and swords whistling through the air’ (Breisach, 1994: 119, 131).

For the Aristotelian perspective (Aristotle, 2005: unpaginated page), the products of the imitative arts are not eternal things, ergo they are not most true. The purpose of art is not to be true, but to give happiness (the writer excels in creating to make himself happy) or aesthetic pleasure (the reader is to feel touched). According to Grabski, in the Middle Ages something is true when an authority declares it as such, even though it may be obviously false (Grabski, 2003: 72–75). The idea of truth in those times also has a peculiar character. If some truth inspired by God was offered and authorities accepted it, then only the question of technique was left for discussion.
Isidore of Seville, although still in a rhetoric manual, distanced history from fables in that ‘[h]istories are true deeds that have happened, plausible narrations are things that, even if they have not happened, nevertheless could happen, and fables are things that have not happened and cannot happen, because they are contrary to nature’ (Isidore of Seville, 2006: 67). This insistence on truthfulness differentiated history from fable but still left the separation of history from literature for future generations.

On the one hand, the Renaissance conception of reality did not differ radically from its predecessors. Based on the antique and medieval traditions (Kelley, 1991: 312), St. Augustine’s claim that God’s law was the *modus operandi* of the world was widely shared by the Renaissance luminaries of history. On the other hand, the changes that were introduced to a providential understanding of the world affected late fifteenth-, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century historiography deeply. According to the Augustinian conception mentioned above, humans were passive enactors, puppets in God’s hands. Defying such a view, Machiavelli initiated, and Jean Bodin developed, a theory of three histories. The assumption was that there existed divine and natural histories governed by the principles outside of human relations. There was, however, also a human history that, as much as was entangled in the latter two, was considered to be largely a product of the human will (Grabski, 2003: 167–168; Breisach, 1994: 158).

Acknowledging the human potential of creating history implicated a number of changes in historiography. Without rigorous divine determination, the human past called for a new conceptualization. The ensuing ‘classificatory anxiety’ led Renaissance historiographers to the conclusion that there were a variety of literary forms through which that past could be represented; that not all of these were actually ‘histories’ according to the strict classical definition of the scope and language that were to be found in works so called; that among that subset of works about the past deemed to be histories there was an implied hierarchy of genres (and within that a ranking of authors according to both stylistic and non-stylistic considerations) at the bottom of which one found the now disparaged chronicle; and, most important, that the quality that connected all works purporting to make true statements about the past was that of being historical. (Woolf, 2005: 28–30)
Thus, what the historiographers of the era did to delineate the boundaries of their trade was to upgrade the argument of an all-encompassing literature.\(^7\) Since Aristotle, literature covered all verbal imitations of reality and therefore history was considered a literary form. Following Aristotle, the Renaissance acknowledged the overarching character of literature and distinguished between non-historical and historical works using their own concept of truth. The difference lay in the fact that for Aristotle truth was, first of all, a question of ‘recognizing’ a correspondence between words and their referents (Aristotle, 2005: unpaginated), whereas for Edward Lord Herbert of Cherbury and his contemporaries, it was also a question of ‘proving’ this correspondence (Woolf, 2005: 36).

Although literature maintained its all-embracing position throughout the Renaissance, historical writing about the past included in it was more and more visibly marked. History’s radical separation from literature came only after a new global vision of the real had been introduced in the seventeenth century Europe. In the aftermath of adopting the concept of material and spiritual progress of humanity, the Enlightenment historians found themselves in need of designing a new method of studying the past. To do so, firstly, they distanced themselves from their predecessors’ ideas and, thus, from what they considered historically biased, unprofessional and most importantly false; that is the fable. ‘History is the recital of facts given as true, in contra-distinction to the fable, which is the recital of facts given as false’, argued Voltaire. Secondly, to establish historiography as an autonomous branch of knowledge (Kelley, 1991: 440; Breisach, 1994: 209), they borrowed from Newtonian mechanics to lay the foundation for their own science. Thus, the concept of mechanistic laws of nature was transplanted to the social world, the disclosure of the universal laws governing the world was made the objective of historical inquiries, and impeccable logic was declared the basis to find truth.

All this was supposed to turn history into a science of reason and to separate it from literature. Nevertheless, were the specific ‘truth-finding methods’ of the era to be investigated, it might be

\(^7\) Truth seemed to be a possible property of literature, with kinds of literature differing with respect to the ‘degree’ of provable truthfulness.
observed that, inasmuch as they depart from the stance that reason alone grants truth (Bates, 2001: 4–5, 12), they end up acknowledging: the role of intuition, as in Vico’s and Herder’s intuitive grasping of insights (Breisach, 1994: 205) or Möser and Locke’s intuitive knowledge (Bates, 2001: 14); subjective judgment, as in Kantian subjective understanding; and most importantly, the literary, as the cases of Coyer, Voltaire and Hume, Gibbon, Schlözer, Bodmer, Condorcet, Fresnay (Grabski, 2003: 300, 317–18, 344–45; Breisach, 1994: 216, 221–222; Bates, 2001: 16; Fresnay, 1730: 319).

Although the historians of the age hailed their trade a science different from fabulating literature, it took the Romantics and their concept of sacred versus historical writing to instigate a definite break between historiography and literature.

The French Revolution put paid to the social order of the late eighteenth-century Europe and made the intellectuals of the time get stuck between a rock of the no longer meaningful past and a hard place of the unstable present. To overcome this impasse, the Romantics embarked on redefining the prevailing basic conventions and categories of their world. Narrowing the term literature to ‘a corpus of privileged texts, a treasury in which value, truth, and beauty had been piously stored’, and giving history the meaning of ‘the faithful record of [empirical] reality’ turned, according to Lionel Gossman, these two modes of writing into opposites (Gossman, 1990: 229). However, even a cursory glance at the definitions—both kinds of texts are to render truth—might cast doubts on the viability of the Romantic literature-history dichotomy. A closer look at how the Romantics perceived both trades, what the role of their practitioners was and what their practice was like, might demonstrate more clearly that, despite alleged differences, Romantic historiography shared many similarities with its alleged literary counterpart.

In ‘What Is, and to What End Do We Study, Universal History?’, Friedrich Schiller declares that there exists the course of the world—‘the real succession of events [that] descends from the origin of objects down to their most recent ordering’—and the course of history, a selective record of events which are put into a coherent whole by the historian (Schiller, 2006: unpaginated). By doing so, Schiller establishes the relation of a historical text to reality
in an Aristotelian, and thus literary, fashion. As the point of departure, he takes the real and makes the (historical) text its mimetic record. Although the division concerns the field of historical studies, it finds its correspondence in the real-and-the-text pair as it exists in the field of literary studies. Acknowledging this parallel seems to justify the argument that, what links history and literature at the most basic level is that in their Romantic versions, they are understood as narratives drawing from reality. Furthermore, they are both designed to recognize and try to overcome the gap between the (past) reality and its (re)construction for, as Lionel Gossman notices, the fractions of the real were perceived as symbols that could be understood only when located in a narrative order. The concept underlying a literary as well as a historical product of this process was that they both were meant to be realizations of a prophetic, truth-giving and revolutionary act of restoring the old world at which the writer and the historian aimed.

This seemed possible for the nineteenth-century sages as they, on the one hand, were convinced they had the best possible perspective on the ever-unveiling scroll of the past and, on the other, thought of themselves as equipped with the divine powers to build the bridge between the past and the present. Ascribing to oneself the role of the decipherer and interpreter of the past as well as crediting oneself with divine traits put the Romantic historian abreast the Romantic poet. In the end, it was also the Romantic poet who experienced the collapse of the eighteenth-century concepts and ideals, who wanted to find appeasement in describing the real and considered himself the interpreter, the god-like prophet and the priest of truth.

Similarities in the performed function also led to convergences in the historian’s and poet’s practice of writing. Firstly, the reliance on a metaphysical understanding of the world entailed for both of them comprehending reality by means of imagination. It was imagination that provided ‘a true insight into the nature of [reality] where both individual phenomena and the vital relations among them could be grasped in their immediacy and presence’. Secondly, as Lionel Gossman notices, both modes of writing relied upon the organicist model of explanation. Whether in literature or historiography, ‘[i]ndividual facts were revealed as rational and intelligible
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, at the level of description historical texts borrowed the techniques of the nineteenth-century novel. Not only can we observe tendencies to design the historical text according to the fashion of fiction, i.e. not ‘as a model to be discussed [...] but as the inmost form of the real’ or introducing ‘the narrator as a privileged reporter recounting what happened’; there are also attempts at evoking in the reader a sense that there was no boundary between him or her and the described object (Gossman, 1990: 244, 260, 297, 305).

Were we to treat Romantic history, historians and historiography as elements of a cobweb of notions and categories, and to do the same with the Romantic literature, writer and literary practice, it seems that the historical cobweb evinces rather parallels to the literary one than contrasts. They both departed from the same world-view, used the same concepts and featured the same techniques. What they share weaves such a thick thread that it is hardly possible to tell which thread belongs to which cobweb or to draw a demarcation line between the two. However, the Romantics saw the divide, and so did modern historians.

The crystallization of the paradigm of the natural sciences that took part in the eighteenth century entailed hierarchic perceptions of particular branches of knowledge. When the humanities formed their separate model of science in the nineteenth century, their methodology owed much to that of the already widely acknowledged natural sciences. In consequence, history—engaged with finding and ordering facts whose truth could be authenticated, measured, assessed according to some material value—moved towards the natural sciences. The idea that the historian could access and offer knowledge, whereas the writer could present only fictional, intangible and impressionistic views on the real, created a wall between the two discourses. This state of affairs lasted until a series of twentieth-century intellectual turns questioned the validity of natural-sciences-based, historiographic reflection:

After about 1960 history did seriously and irrevocably begin to decompose into a plethora of smaller histories (social, economic, religious, intellectual, cultural, women’s and so forth), narrative history of events (meaning typically large-scale public events of politics, diplomacy
and war) did cede pole position to analytical accounts of deep structures and spatio-temporal conjunctures, and new -isms (especially feminism, comparativism and constructionism) have joined the older empiricist and Marxist tendencies. [...] Worse still, from the point of view of conservatives, self-styled ‘progressive’ historiography, most noticeably in its postmodernist or New Historicist forms, not only has abandoned even the weakest versions of the nineteenth-century positivist claim that history was a science, no more and no less, but has even questioned the sacred notion of historical truth, in the name either of a rhetoric of discourse or of an ethical and/or cultural relativism. (Gossman, 1990: 4–5)

Only then was it recognized that a human sciences paradigm demands a redefinition, that is, an adoption of a different perspective on the objects it scrutinizes, and consequently a reformulation of the questions it asks. Out of the turns’ googol of corollaries, the ones that concern the contemporary understanding of the relationship of literature and history are crucial for this study. Literary reflection of the twentieth century, on the one hand, continued to employ the perspectives that adhere to the fact-fiction as well as history-literature divides. On the other, it also created theories which question such divisions. Hans-Georg Gadamer writes that ‘[l]iterature in the broadest sense is bounded only by what can be said, for everything that can be said can be written [...] the concept of literature embraces not only works of literary art but everything passed down in writing’ (Gadamer, 2004: 155–156). Although this

8 The Russian Formalism is the only methodology that still recognizes literary vs. non-literary texts division.
9 See Gadamer’s Truth and Method: ‘There are works of scholarship whose literary merit has caused them to be considered works of art and part of world literature. This is clear from the point of view of aesthetic consciousness, inasmuch as the latter does not consider the significance of such works’ contents but only the quality of their form as important. But since our criticism of aesthetic consciousness has shown the limited validity of that point of view, this principle dividing literary art from other written texts becomes dubious for us. We have seen that aesthetic consciousness is unable to grasp the essential truth even of literary art. For literary art has in common with all other texts the fact that it speaks to us in terms of the significance of its contents. Our understanding is not specifically concerned with its formal achievement as a work of art but with what it says to us.

’The difference between a literary work of art and any other text is not so fundamental. It is true that there is a difference between the language poetry and the language of prose, and again between the language of poetic prose and that of “scientific” or “scholarly” prose. These differ-
definition seems to be an umbrella term in the Aristotelian fashion, Gadamer does not see imitation as the unifying principle of all texts; instead, he opts for a concept of understanding as the common base. According to him, regardless of whether we talk about reading a literary or a historical piece, their production is subject to the same process of understanding/interpreting.

Understanding any text starts with a projection of a sense that might be encountered in it. The project is determined by hidden prejudices which shape our fore-meanings. These, in turn, are either incessantly spurred or revised by what continually emerges in the text (Gadamer, 2004: 269). The understanding we achieve in the process of reading is thus a realization of our projections, our interpretation of the text, not ‘a simple reflection of what is given to the senses’ (Gadamer, 2004: 155, 269–272). Thus, reading a historical text or source does not guarantee access to ‘wie es eigentlich gewesen’ (how things have really been), but rather creating an interpretation of it. Consequently, writing professional history and historical novels that follow such an interpretation turns out to be creating one’s vision of the past formed on the basis of yet another vision.

However, inasmuch as Gadamer’s theory of understanding locates historical texts within an all-encompassing concept of literature and thus justifies literary analyses of historical texts, it is also crucial to ask whether a reverse maneuver is methodologically viable. To demonstrate that a literary text, in this case the historical novel, might be a subject of historical inquiry, I would
like to refer to Hayden White’s concepts of the historical text as literary artefact and product of historical imagination.

The entire concept of metahistory might be said to have been developed from Hayden White’s understanding of historical work as ‘a verbal structure in the form of a narrative prose discourse that purports to be a model, or icon, of that past structure and processes in the interest of explaining what they were by representing them’ (White, 1975: 2). A historical text, then, instead of offering access to the past itself, offers the writer’s vision of this past, and his or her interpretation of the past events is given to us in a narrative form (Munslow, 2006: 36; White, 1978: 128). Should we think of literary works in these terms, it seems that this definition might be applied as well to the historical novel. In the end, it is also a text written in prose intended to represent past events, people, objects and processes.

Nevertheless, for White, historical and literary texts are similar not only at this most overt, narrative level. Similarly to Gadamer’s view that understanding is the process that underlies all modes of writing about the past, White talks about the deep structure of historical imagination as preconceptual and poetic. Even without getting into the details of his theory, it might be deduced that White’s claims parallel those of Gadamer: both thinkers point out in their theories that both literary and historical texts are the result of an interpretation of past events. If this is so, then White’s theory provides a reason for treating historical novels as products of the author’s historical consciousness and makes it possible to apply tools of metahistorical analysis to them.

To conclude and simultaneously to come back to the thesis from the beginning of my presentation, I would like to sum up my findings first and then refer to Ghosh’s perspective on history. Through ages, history has been conceptualized as either a story of the fall or progress of man, as the repository of meanings, as interpretation, and in numerous other ways. Similarly, the search for literariness continues assiduously, and incessantly provides us with ever new definitions of what literature might be. Realizing the amount of changes that these two notions have undergone, as well as their internal complexity and the problematic relations they have enjoyed, may make one think about Amitav Ghosh’s
historical perspective as a peculiar one for a twenty-first century thinker. Should we look at the past from his river-like perspective, a variety of concepts that have been devised could not be explained in its terms. Treating events as happening in a unidirectional, chronological sequence through which humans go from point A to Z—or as Ghosh might probably say, flow from the source of the river to its end—is of course possible, and such concepts have already been offered previously (Heraclitus, Hegel). However, the idea doesn’t seem to take into consideration the fact that such concepts have also been already discarded due to their simplistic propensities. History and literature and their possible relationships to each other are complex enough to take into account their intricacies. Should we consider history an ocean of events that interact in their incessant flow, then such thinking allows one to understand that various concepts of what history is are possible. An ocean seems the frame sufficiently broad to encompass all the varieties of historical perspectives that we can encounter in the post-human age. What is more, such a perspective might also enable us to understand that labelling a piece of writing as history or literature depends on the assumptions of both author and reader.
Works Cited


