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The boundaries of scriptural cognition
The examination of *śruta-jñāna* in its relation
to *mati-jñāna* on the basis of
Tattvārtha-sūtra-rāja-vārttika by Akalanka

**Granice poznania językowego. Analiza poznania językowego (*śruta-jñāna*)
w jego relacji do poznania zmysłowego (*mati-jñāna*) na podstawie traktatu
Tattvartha-sutra-radža-wartika Akalanki**

Abstrakt: W artykule analizuję wybrane fragmenty *Tattvartha-sutra-radža-wartiki* Akalanki (VIII w.) w celu uzyskania odpowiedzi na pytanie: jakie są granice poznania werbalnego? Wskazuję poszczególne aspekty relacji pomiędzy poznaniem zmysłowym i poznaniem werbalnym: porządek przyczynowo-skutkowy, częściowe pokrywanie się zakresów tych dwóch poznań, możliwość ich błędu i różne sposoby ich osiągnięcia. Te cztery zagadnienia zostały wzięte pod uwagę po to, aby nakreślić cechy obu poznań, pozostających we wzajemnej relacji. Dołączam krótką analizę ustępów *Wisieszawasjakabhaszji* — tekstu poprzedzającego czasowo traktat Akalanki — w których ów problem został uwzględniony, pokazując w ten sposób podstawową spójność i zwartość dzinijskiego systemu myśli.

Słowa kluczowe: Akalanka, Dżinabhadra Gani, *śruta-jñāna*, *mati-jñāna*, *pūrvakatva*, *karman*, *(vi)pariñāma*, *viśaya*.

Introduction

The aim of the article is to determine the boundaries of *śruta-jñāna* ('scriptural cognition') in its relation to *mati-jñāna* ('sensory cognition') on the basis of *Tattvārtha-sūtra-rāja-vārttika* (RVār, 'Royal Annotation of *Tattvārtha-sūtra*') by Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa (8th c. CE), the commentary to the 5th century Umāsvāmi/Umāsvāti's treatise *Tattvārtha-sūtra* (TS, 'The Treatise on Reals', 4th/5th). Jain points out that "all the Jaina masters have accepted that the scriptural knowledge (language based cognition) is not possible without the sensory knowledge (sense cognition)."¹

The problem of cognitive apparatus, consistently present in the Jain philosophical literature and undergoing successive changes, has been discussed and systematised by Piotr Balcerowicz in his numerous works,² Indra Chandra Shastri,³ Puthenpurayil Mathew Joseph,⁴ Subramania Gopalan,⁵ and other scholars. Therefore, the present article does not aim at exploring the topic in its entirety, but at indicating particular aspects of the relation between *mati-jñāna* and *śruta-jñāna*, mainly the indissoluble cause-and-effect order, the overlapping scopes of these two forms of cognition, the possibility of their being wrong, and various means of their attainment. These four issues could be taken into consideration in order to present both of them in their mutual relations; they also draw attention to the fact that there are factors blocking *śruta-jñāna* and reveal its relevant limitations. I am particularly interested in the role of scriptural cognition in this relation as a multivariable cognitive tool that forms a specific cognitive domain, broadening the perspective offered by the sensory domain.

¹ S. JAIN: *Jaina Philosophy of Language*. Parshwanath Vidyapeeth Series. Varanasi 2006, p. 18.

² P. BALCEROWICZ: "Some Remarks on the Sensuous Cognition (*mati-jñāna*) Process." *Jain Journal* 1989 (July), No. 14(1), pp. 17—21; "Zarys dżinijskiej teorii poznania." *Studia Indologiczne* 1994, No. 2, pp. 12—67; "Pramanas and language. A Dispute between Dignaga, Dharmakirti and Akalaṅka." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 2005, 33(4), pp. 343—400; "Extrasensory Perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) in Jainism. Proofs of Its Existence and Its Soteriological Implications." In: C.K. CHAPPLE (ed.): *Yoga in Jainism. Routledge Advances in Jaina Studies*. Oxford—New York 2016, pp. 48—108; "Extrasensory Perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) in Jainism and Its Refutations." In: C.K. CHAPPLE (ed.): *Yoga in Jainism...*, pp. 109—124.

³ I.C. SHASTRI: *Jaina Epistemology*. Varanasi 1990.

⁴ P.M. JOSEPH: *Jainism in South India*. International School of Dravidian Linguistics. Tiruvananthapuram 1997.

⁵ S. GOPALAN: *Outlines of Jainism*. New York 1973.

Although in the English literature the term *jñāna* is usually translated as ‘knowledge’ or ‘awareness,’ I translate it as ‘cognition’ unless another term is used in the passage quoted.

The epistemological context of *mati-jñāna* and *śruta-jñāna* within Jainism

Reflection on sensory cognition and scriptural cognition can be found in Jain epistemological presuppositions expressed in the texts of the Jaina canon, as well as in later works. *Viyāhapannatti*, Skr. *Vyākhyā-prajñapti* (ViP, ‘The Teaching on Explanations’), known also under the title *Bhagavaī*, Skr. *Bhagavatī-sūtra* (‘The Blessed Composition’), the fifth part (*aṃga*) of the canon, may serve as a prime example. In Deleu’s critical analysis of ViP, the cognitive accoutrements of the soul are specified:

The characteristic (*lakṣhaṇa*) of Soul is the spiritual function (*uvaoga*). By its own nature (*āya-bhāveṇam*) Soul as a matter of fact possesses will (*is sautṭhāna* [...]), which enables it to apply this spiritual function in the infinite number of possibilities (*pajjava*) of cognition — viz. in the domains of the five knowledges, the three non-knowledges and the three visions (*daṃsaṇa*) — thus revealing the true nature of Soul (*jīva-bhāva*) (ViP 149a, p. 94).

Apart from presenting the cognitive domain — comprising five types of cognition (Pkt. *nāṇa*), their opposites (the three types of non-cognition, Pkt. *annāṇa*), and three types of vision (Pkt. *daṃsaṇa*) — the importance of the above excerpt consists in assigning all cognitive abilities to a particular living being endowed with spiritual power and in stressing that this kind of attribution is innate and constitutional. This division is also referred to in ViP 257band ViP 348a. Sometimes its further ramifications are mentioned (ViP 342b, p. 146). In some places, Deleu points out obvious references to other texts, such as: *Naṃdī-sutta*, Skr. *Nandī-sūtra* (NaS, ‘The Auspicious Sūtra’) and *Rāyapaseṇiya*, Skr. *Rājaprasṇīya* (RS, ‘The King’s Questions’).⁶

⁶ Balcerowicz discusses the different versions of this title in P. BALCEROWICZ: “Monks, Monarchs and Materialists.” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 2005, No. 33(5—6), p. 571. Deleu refers to Rāyap. 130a. Kristi Wiley summarises the content of this text: *Narrative*

According to him, in ViP 356a, the author considers the scope (*visaya*) of these types of cognition “from the point of view of matter, space, time and condition,”⁷ and their aspects, such as duration, interruptibility, and relative frequency (p. 147). Taking into account canonical works, the five types of cognition are also enumerated in *Anuyoga-ddārāim*, Skr. *Anuyoga-dvārāṇi* (AD, ‘The Means of Analysis’), one of the two “minor books” (Pkt. *cūliyā*, Skr. *cūlikā*),⁸ and in *Āvassaya-sutta*, Skr. *Āvaśyaka-sūtra* (ĀS, ‘The Sūtra on the Obligatory Rites’), one of the “basic sūtras” (Pkt. *mūla-sutta*, Skr. *mūla-sūtra*).⁹

Digambara Kundakunda (1st or 3rd c. CE),¹⁰ called by Dundas “one of [...] (India’s) most intense advocates of the centrality of inward experience and the reorientation of all religious practice to focus upon the self;”¹¹ reflects in *Niyama-sāra* (NSā, ‘The Quintessence of Restraint’) on human “cognitive application” or “cognitive faculties” (Pkt. *uvayoga*, Skr. *upayoga*)¹² — innate (Pkt. *sabhāva*, Skr. *svabhāva*) or non-natural (Pkt. *vibhāva*, Skr. *vibhāva*) (NSā 1.10) — actualised in the form of vision (Pkt. *daṃsaṇa*, Skr. *darśana*) and cognition (Pkt. *ñāṇa*, Skr. *jñāna*) (cf. TS 2.8, 18). Akalaṅka would underline that they have two different modes of acting (*cāritrāṇi*): vision is connected with “seeing” (*dr̥ṣṭi*) and cognition with “cognising” (*jñāti*) (RVār 1.1.23). Balcerowicz defines their specificity and differences between them:

Traditionally the cognitive faculties bifurcated into cognition (*jñāna*) and perceptual experience (*darśana*) [...], which already brought the seed of contradiction into the classification of cognitions. The difference between the two lay in cognition being distinct, i.e. having definite contents (*sākāra*), and in perceptual experience being indistinct, not having any definite contents (*anākāra*, *nirākāra*). Sometimes [...] [to clarify] the division, which apparently did not seem completely unam-

of King Pāesi (Prasenajit) of Seyaviyā, who questions Keśi, a disciple of Pārśvanātha, the 23rd Tīrthaṅkara of this era, about the nature of the soul. K.L. WILEY: *The A to Z of Jainism*. Lankam, MD, 2009, p. xxi.

⁷ davvao khettao kālao bhāvao. It is, as Deleu marks, the reference to NaS 97a, 107b.

⁸ P. BALCEROWICZ: *Dżinizm. Starożytna religia Indii: historia, rytuał, literatura*. Warszawa 2003, p. 200.

⁹ P. BALCEROWICZ: *Dżinizm. Starożytna religia Indii...*, pp. 201—202. D. MALVANIA, J. SONI: “Jain Philosophy,” part 1. In: *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. 10. Delhi 2007, p. 225.

¹⁰ P. BALCEROWICZ: *Dżinizm. Starożytna religia Indii...*, p. 225.

¹¹ P. DUNDAS: *The Jains*. London—New York 2003, p. 107.

¹² The first term after D. MALVANIA, J. SONI: “Jain Philosophy...,” the second one after P. BALCEROWICZ: “Siddhasena Mahāmāti and Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa. A Revolution in Jaina Epistemology.” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 2016, No. 44(5), pp. 993—1039.

biguous, the former was defined as manifest (*vyakta*) and the latter as not manifest (*avyakta*).¹³

Kundakunda's theory was one of the first that combined the concept of cognitive faculties with the five-fold classification of cognition types. Earlier, as Balcerowicz underlines, the classification had been "mentioned in the context of the path to liberation" and "referred to the practical capability of the soul to apply all its innate endowments that were relevant to achieve the ultimate goal of existence."¹⁴ Kundakunda points out this complementarity and identifies the five types of cognition (naming them) in the light of their (non-)naturalness:

Innate cognition [is] absolute, free from the help of senses and independent. Non-natural cognition would be of two kinds, when an alternative between right cognition and the other [is admitted].¹⁵ Right cognition [is] of four kinds: sensory, scriptural, clairvoyant [and] telepathic, and a lack of cognition [is] of three varieties, dividing into a lack of sensory [cognition] etc. (NSā 11—12).¹⁶

Similarly, cognitive application is associated, according to NSā, with vision:

In like manner, visual cognitive application is twofold: in accordance with its own nature (innate) and of the other kind. [It has been] said [that visual cognitive application, which is] in accordance with its own nature (innate), [is] absolute, free from the help of senses, and independent. Non-natural vision [is] said [to be] of three kinds: ocular, non-ocular, and clairvoyant (NSā 13—14a).¹⁷

¹³ P. BALCEROWICZ: "Siddhasena Mahāmati and Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa..." p. 1002. Cf. RVār 2.9.1—2.

¹⁴ P. BALCEROWICZ: "Siddhasena Mahāmati and Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa..." p. 1003.

¹⁵ Translation of *saṃjñāna* after D. MALVANIA, J. SONI: "Jain Philosophy..." p. 121.

¹⁶ [Prakrit version:] kevalamiṃdiyarahiyaṃ asahāyaṃ taṃ sahāvaṇṇaṃ tti.

saṇṇānidaraviyappe vihāvaṇṇaṃ have duvihaṃ.

saṇṇāṇaṃ caubheyaṃ madisudaaohī taheva maṇapajjaṃ.

aṇṇāṇaṃ tiviyappaṃ madiyāi bhedado ceva

[Sanskrit chāyā:] kevalam indriya-rahitam asahāyaṃ tat-svabhāva-jñānam iti.

saṃjñānētara-vikalpe vibhāva-jñānaṃ bhaved dvividham.

saṃjñānaṃ catur-bhedaṃ mati-śrutāvadhayaṃ tathaīva manaḥ-paryayam.

ajñānaṃ trivikalpaṃ matyāder bhedaś caīva.

Prakrit version and Sanskrit chāyā after NSā. My own translations of all NSā fragments are based on Sanskrit chāyā.

¹⁷ [Prakrit version:] taha daṃsaṇauvaogo sasahāvedaraviyappado duviho kevalamiṃdiyarahiyaṃ asahāyaṃ taṃ sahāvamidi bhaṇidaṃ. cakkhu acakkhū ohī tiṇṇivī bhaṇidaṃ vibhāvadicchitti.

These passages include information on two kinds (Pkt. *duviyappo*, Skr. *dvivikalpa*) of complementary modes (Pkt. *pajjāo*, Skr. *paryāyo*): one dependent solely on itself (Pkt. *saparāvekkho*, Skr. *svaparāpekṣa*), that is, innate (Pkt. *sabhāva*, Skr. *svabhāva*), and one that is independent (Pkt. *niravekkho*, Skr. *nirapekṣa*), that is, non-natural (Pkt. *vibhāva*, Skr. *vibhāva*). Kundakunda attributes the former to those that are free from a disguise of karman (Pkt. *kammopādhivivajjiya*, Skr. *karmōpādhi-vivarjita*), and the latter to human (Pkt. *ṇara*, Skr. *nara*) and hellish (Pkt. *ṇāraya*, Skr. *nāraka*) beings, amphibious animals (Pkt. *tiriya*, Skr. *tiryak*), and heavenly creatures (Pkt., Skr. *sura*) (NSā 14b—15).

In *Sanmati-tarka* (ST, ‘The Well-disposed Reasoning’), Siddhasena Divākara (6th c. CE) claims that *mati-jñāna* and *śruta-jñāna* are “responsible for arriving at cognition of categories”¹⁸ and adds that “the term *darśana* cannot be applied to *śruta-jñāna* because the things conceived by *śruta-jñāna* cannot be directly conceived.”¹⁹ Balcerowicz emphasises that in the earlier tradition, the term *darśana* meant ‘conation’ (belief, religious worldview, also: an act of will), and that it was at later stages that its meaning evolved towards ‘vision’ and ‘perceptual experience’ (cf. ST 2.1—33).²⁰

With regard to the five basic types of cognition: sensory or connected with the mind (Pkt.²¹*madi*, Skr. *mati*), scriptural (Pkt. *suda*, Skr. *śruta*), visual/clairvoyant (Pkt. *ohī*, Skr. *avadhi*), mental/telepathic (Pkt. *maṇam* [*manapajjaya*], Skr. *manaḥ* [*manahparyaya*]), and perfect/omniscient (Pkt. *kevalayaṃ* [*kevalam*], Skr. *kevalam*), it should be stressed that they are mentioned and comprehensively discussed in later texts, starting with *Tattvārtha-sūtra* (TS 1.9), “one of the most sacred texts of Jainism,”²² important to the Digambara and Śvetāmbara tradition, and ending with *Gommaṭa-sāra* (GS XII 300, ‘The Quintessence of Gommaṭa’) and *Dravya-saṃgraha* (DS 5, ‘The Compendium of Substance’), both authored by Digambara Nemichandra Saiddhāntika Cakravartī (10th c. CE), as well as *Ālāpa-paddhatī* (AP 36—38, ‘The Course of Question’), an appendix to *Naya-cakra* (NC, ‘The Wheel of Methods’) by Devasena (10th c. CE).

[Sanskrit chāyā:] tathā darśanōpayogaḥ sva-svabhāvētara-vikalpato dvividhaḥ
kevalam indriya-rahitam asahāyaṃ tat-svabhāva iti bhaṇitaḥ.
caḥsur acakṣur avadhayas tiso’pi bhaṇitā vibhāva-dṛṣṭiriti.

¹⁸ mai-suyaṇāṇa-ṇimitto chaumathe hoi attha-uvalambho, ST 2.27—28, pp. 94—95.

¹⁹ jaṃ pañcakkhaggahaṇaṃ ṇa inti suyaṇāṇasammīyā atthā/tamhā dāmsaṇasaddo ṇa hoi sayale vi suyaṇāṇe, ST 2.28, p. 95. All quotations after ST.

²⁰ P. BALCEROWICZ: “Siddhasena Mahāmāti and Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa...” p. 1003.

²¹ All Prakrit terms on the basis of GS XII 300, p. 175.

²² N. SHAH: *Jainism: The World of Conquerors*, Vol. 1. Delhi 2004, p. 90.

The comprehensive exploration of types of cognition in GS is one of the most detailed discussions in the whole Jain literature (GS XII 299—488); it begins with a definition of knowledge:

(That) by which (the soul) knows (all) the substances, (and their) attributes, and many kinds of modifications, pertaining to the three times (past, present, and future), directly and indirectly, is the knowledge (Jñána), so to say (GS XII 299).²³

This list is often followed by four kinds of *mati-jñāna*: indistinct (*avagraha*), directed (*īha*), determinative (*avāya/apāya*), and focused/retentional (*dhāraṇā*)²⁴ (TS 1.15, LT 1.5,²⁵ RVār 1.15.1—13), called by Jain “materialization of *mati-jñāna*,”²⁶ manifesting themselves in different ways (TS 1.16). Ernst Leumann, in his analysis of Jinabhadra Gaṇi’s (6th/7th c. CE) *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* (ViBh, ‘The Commentary of Specific Āvaśyaka [Verses]’), argues that *avagraha* (in ViBh *oggaha*) should be considered as “general perception,” *īhā* as “more precise perception,” *avāya/apāya* as “cognition,” and *dhāraṇā* as “permanent impression” (ViBh 1.179).²⁷ The abovementioned processes, together with their exact arrangement, are prerequisite for correctly functioning sensory cognition. However, there are problems with their naming, identifying their denotations, and determining their content.

Both types of cognition are often presented as comprising many subdivisions. When it comes to sensory cognition, Nemichandra’s classification is extremely detailed — it has 336 classes. Scriptural cognition is divided by Umāsvāmi into two, twelve, and many kinds (TS 1.20). With regard to non-verbal scriptural cognition (Pkt. *aṇakṇarappa*, Skr. *anakṣarātmaka*) (GS XII 316), Nemichandra enumerates twenty kinds of *śruta-jñāna*²⁸ and

²³ [Prakrit version:] jāṇai tikālavisaē davvaguṇe pajjāe ya bahu-bhede. paccakhaṃ ca parokkhaṃ aṇeṇa ṇāṇetti ṇaṃ beṃti. [Sanskrit chāyā:] jānāti trikālavīṣayān dravya-guṇān paryāyāṃś ca bahu-bhedān. pratyakṣaṃ ca paroṅkṣaṃ anena jñānam iti idaṃ bruvanti.

²⁴ D. MALVANIA, J. SONI: “Jain Philosophy...”

²⁵ LT is the short for Akalaṅka’s *Laghīyas-traya* (‘The Three Very Accessible [Chapters]’).

²⁶ S. JAIN: “Jaina Philosophy of Language.” Parshwanath Vidyapeeth Series. No. 145. Varanasi—Vardhamana Mudranalaya—Jawahar Nagar 2006, p. 16.

²⁷ E. LEUMANN: *An Outline of Avasyaka Literature*. Trans. G. BAUMAN. Ahmedabad 2010, pp. 106—107. He adds, on the basis of ViBh 1.192, that there are two types of general perception, i.e., *vanjaṇa* (Skr. *vyāñjana*), which is to be understood as “perceiving molecular stimulation,” and *attha* (Skr. *artha*), allowing to “conceive the thing” (E. LEUMANN: *An Outline of Avasyaka Literature...*, p. 107).

²⁸ There are: minimum (Pkt. *pajjāya*, Skr. *paryāya*), indestructible (Pkt. *khara*, Skr. *akṣara*), foot (Pkt., Skr. *pada*), division (Pkt. *saṃghāda*, Skr. *saṃghāta*), part (Pkt.

twenty intermediate stages resulting from adding the noun *samāsa* ('connection, combination') to each of these kinds (GS XII 317—318).

The term *mati* itself, according to TS, is equivalent (*anarthāntara*) to *smṛti* ('remembrance, memory'), *saṃjñā* ('recognition'), *cintā* ('thought, consideration'), or *abhinibodha/ābhinibodhika* ('apprehension') (TS 1.13).²⁹ The last-mentioned sense is referred to, for example, in NaS 31—38, ViBh 79,³⁰ and GS XII 315. Several centuries later, in *Laghīyas-traya* (LT, 'Three Very Accessible [Chapters]'), Akalaṅka juxtaposes these terms³¹ in one line, treating them as having different meanings (LT 1.10). Balcerowicz translates them as sensuous cognition/memory, cognitive cognition, inductive thinking/association, and determinate cognition, respectively.³² In *Tattvārtha-śloka-vārtikālaṃkara* (TŚVA, 'The Ornament of Annotations on *Tattvārtha*'s Stanzas'), Vidyānanda Pātrakesarisvāmin (9th c. CE) quotes this passage, replacing the term *mati* with *smṛti* (TŚVA 239).³³ The term *śruta* is replaced with *āgama* as, a synonym used, for instance, by Māṅikyanandin (10th c. CE), the author of *Parīkṣāmukha* (PĀ, 'An Commencement to

paḍivattiya, Skr. *pratipattika*), exposition (Pkt. *aṇijoga*, Skr. *anuyoga*), subdivisions and chapter (Pkt. *dvigavārapāhuḍaṃ ca ya pāhuḍayam*, Skr. *dvikavāraprābhṛtaṃ ca ca prābhṛta*), content (Pkt. *vatthu*, Skr. *vasu*), and the fore part (Pkt. *puvvaṃ*, Skr. *pūrvam*).

²⁹ Caityapragya comments on the term *ābhinibodhika*: "Perceptual cognition (*matijñāna*) is the kind of cognition that processes information acquired through senses and mind. This cognition (*matijñāna*) is more commonly called as *ābhinibodhika jñāna* (Nandi, ed. by Ācārya Mahaprajna, p. 3) in agamic literature (Bhagavaī. 88.2.317), defined in as '*abhinibujjhaitti ābhinibohiyānaṃ*' to get to know about object is *ābhinibodhika jñāna* (Nandi, ed by Ācārya Mahaprajna, p. 35)." S. CAITYAPRAGYA: *Jain Theory of Knowledge and Cognitive Science*. Ladnun, Jain Vishva Bharati University, 2015. http://www.herenow4u.net/index.php?id=106647#marker_6 [access: 21.06.2016].

³⁰ [Prakrit version:] *atthādo atthaṃtaramuvalaṃbhaṃ taṃ bhaṇaṃti sudaṇāṇaṃ. ābhiṇivohiyapuvvaṃ ṇiyameṇiha saddajaṃ pamuham. [Sanskrit chāyā:] ābhiṇibodhikajñānaṃ śruta-jñānaṃ caivāvadhijñānaṃ ca tathā manaḥparyaya-jñānaṃ kevala-jñānaṃ ca pañcamakaṃ. 'Sensory cognition, scriptural cognition and clairvoyance, In that manner telepathy and the fifth — omniscience'.*

³¹ *matih, saṃjñā, cintā, ābhinibodhika.*

³² P. BALCEROWICZ: "Pramanas and Language. A Dispute between Dignaga, Dharmakirti and Akalaṅka." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 2005, No. 33(4), p. 343. Balcerowicz explains that the first one "embraces all cognitive processes that are directly based on the activity of sense organs and that culminate in the act of retention (*dhāraṇā*), or 'saving' the directly perceived image of an object to the residue memory," the idea of the second "is the determination and identification of things through comparing them with their image preserved in memory," the third one "consists in generalization on the basis of a series of single similar events," and the fourth one "completes sense-related cognitive processes with a definite conclusion." P. BALCEROWICZ: "Pramanas and Language..." pp. 343—344.

³³ After P. BALCEROWICZ: "Pramanas and Language..." p. 344.

Analysis’), who defines it as “the cognition of an object whose basis is the utterance etc. of a trustworthy person” (PĀ 3.95).³⁴

In Jain epistemology, scriptural cognition performs a special and well-defined function. For Umāsvāmi, it is “[the domain of] that which is not the senses,”³⁵ and it is above all proper reasoning (*vitarka*) (TS 9.43). Nemichandra describes *śruta-jñāna* as “[the knowledge] of another object through an object [cognised through sensory cognition],”³⁶ “born out of words”³⁷ (GS XII 315).³⁸ According to Māṇikyanandin, “words etc. are the cause of knowledge of the real thing,”³⁹ and this is possible “thanks to [their] power of innate semantic consistency and convention.”⁴⁰ It is the word, endowed with immeasurable and imponderable potential, that is situated in the center of the *śruta-jñāna* processes. The innate power of the word is emphasised by Prabhācandra (11th c. CE) in *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* (PKM, ‘The Lotus Sun of Objects of Cognition’) and by Anantavīrya (10th/11th c. CE) in *Parīkṣāmukha-laghu-vṛtti* (PĀLV, ‘An Accessible Commentary to *Parīkṣāmukha*’). Glasenapp states that according to Jain thought, *śruta-jñāna* is “the knowledge which is based on the interpretation of signs, i.e. understanding of words, writings, gestures, etc.”⁴¹ Tatia indicates that this term pertains to “knowledge embodied in the scriptures” as well as “knowledge of the scriptures.”⁴² Dundas calls this explanation “slightly blurred” and stresses that *śruta-jñāna* “is dependent upon those who reveal it and at the same time reveals the truth itself.”⁴³ Balcerowicz puts it as follows:

The second type of testimonial cognition (*śruta*; lit. ‘the heard’/‘the revealed’, i.e. the cognition of what is heard, i.e. based on language communication) covered all cognition that was not based on direct

³⁴ āpta-vacanādi-nibandhanam artha-jñānam āgamaḥ.

³⁵ anindriyasya, TS 2.21.

³⁶ Pkt. atthādo atthaṃtaramuvalambhaṃ, Skr. arthād arthāntaram upalabhamānaṃ.

³⁷ Pkt. saddajam, Skr. śabda-jam.

³⁸ [Prakrit version:] atthādo atthaṃtaramuvalambhaṃ taṃ bhaṇanti sudaṇṇaṃ/ābhiṇivohiyapuvvaṃ niyameṇiḥa saddajam pamuham. [Sanskrit chāyā:] arthād arthāntaram upalabhamānaṃ tad bhaṇanti śruta-jñānam ābhiniḥbodhika-pūrvam niyameṇa iḥa śabda-jam pramukham. Text after GS, p. 182.

³⁹ śabdādayo vastu-pratipatti-hetavaḥ, PĀ 3.96.

⁴⁰ saḥaja-yogyatā-saṅketa-vaśād dhi, PĀ 3.96.

⁴¹ H. GLASENAPP: *Jainism: An Indian Religion of Salvation*. Trans. S.B. SHROTRI. Delhi 1999, p. 205.

⁴² N. TATIA: *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*. Fremont 2006, p. 48.

⁴³ P. DUNDAS: “Somnolent Sūtras: Scriptural Commentary in Śvetāmbara Jainism.” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 1996, No. 24, pp. 73—101. http://www.jainlibrary.org/elib_master/article/250000_article_english/somnolent_sutras_scriptural_commentary_in_svet_ambara_jainism_269690_hr6.pdf [access 29.08.2016].

experience of the cognizing subject but on verbal testimony provided by another person. In the first place, it connoted all cognitions derived from scriptures or orally transmitted scriptural tradition, i.e. imparted by a religious authority (the ‘revelation’).⁴⁴

This outline of the theory of cognition is strictly connected with the problem of cognitive criteria. Umāsvāmi distinguishes between direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*) and indirect (*parokṣa*) one. Direct forms of cognition are *mati-jñāna* and *śruta-jñāna*; the other three are indirect (TS 1.9—12, cf. TSBh 1.9—12).⁴⁵ This problem is also raised by Devasena, who refers to the fact that a living being cognises substance (*dravya*), its qualities (*guṇa*), and its modes (*pariyāya*) with the help of cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*) and viewpoints (*naya*):

In what manner [are] they (i.e., substance, qualities, and modes) to be cognised? When one wishes to use *pramāṇa* and *naya*. *Pramāṇa* is correct cognition. It has two [kinds]: perception and the other [kind]. Clairvoyance and telepathy [are] imperfect direct cognitions. Omniscience is complete cognition. Sensory and scriptural [are] indirect cognitions (AP 32—38).⁴⁶

More complex characteristics of *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*, of different features and content, are given by Māṇikyanandin. According to him, *pramāṇa* is a type of cognition “whose nature [is such that it] ascertains itself and an object not ascertained before.”⁴⁷ The first cognitive criterion, *pratyakṣa* (‘present before the eyes,’ ‘perceptible,’ ‘ocular evidence’),⁴⁸ is clear (*viśada*), and its clearness (*vaiśadyam*) should be understood as an “illumination without any apprehension [that would be] intervening and through [something] which possesses special properties.”⁴⁹ The second criterion, *parokṣa* (‘in an invisible or imperceptible manner,’ ‘beyond the range

⁴⁴ P. BALCEROWICZ: “Siddhasena Mahāmāti and Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa...,” pp. 998—999.

⁴⁵ Balcerowicz underlines that among problems related to perception, there is one connected with naming this act of grasping real objects: “which term, i.e., whether *pratyakṣa* or *mati-jñāna/ ābhiniḥodhika-jñāna* could correctly apply to what one understood as perception or to one of its subvarieties.” P. BALCEROWICZ: “Extrasensory Perception...,” p. 51.

⁴⁶ te kuto jñeyāḥ. pramāṇa-naya-vivakṣātaḥ. samyag-jñānam pramāṇam. tad-dvedhā pratyakṣētara-bhedāt. avadhi-manaḥpariyayau vikala-pratyakṣau. kevalam sakala-pratyakṣam. mati-śrute parokṣe.

⁴⁷ svāpūrvārtha-vyavasāyātmaka, PĀ 1.1.

⁴⁸ M. MONIER-WILLIAMS: *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*. Delhi 2005, p. 674.

⁴⁹ pratīty-antarāvyavadhānena viśeṣavattayā vā pratibhāsanam, PĀ 2.4—5.

of sight'),⁵⁰ follows from the previous one⁵¹ and has the following varieties: memory, recognition, suppositional cognition, inference, and scripture.⁵² Obvious differences between standpoints of various Jain thinkers prove the evolving character of crucial epistemological concepts and whole theories, which become more sophisticated in the course of time.

Cognition can be disturbed by the interference of karman. Cognition, as well as vision, are modified due to obstruction (*āvaraṇa*, 'covering,' 'hiding,' 'concealing,' 'an interruption') by the influx (*āsrava*) of karmic particles (TS 6.2) or "karmic dirt"⁵³ caused by: deterioration (*pradoṣa*), concealment (*nihnava*), jealousy (*mātsarya*), obstacle (*antarāya*), disregard (*āsādana*), and disparagement (*upaghāta*) (TS 6.10).⁵⁴ The self, dominated by passion (*sakaṣāyatva*), is confronted with the phenomenon called "bondage" (*bandha*), consisting in attracting (*ādātte*) matter (*puḍgala*) capable of becoming karman (*karmaṇo योग्यान*) (TS 8.2, cf. SAS 8.2⁵⁵). "Cognition-obscuring" (*jñānāvaraṇa*) and "vision-obscuring" (*darśanāvaraṇa*) are two of eight kinds of "bondage according to the nature of karmic matter" (*prakṛti-[bandha]*) (TS 8.3—4). There are five varieties of karman obscuring cognition due to its five types.⁵⁶ This kind of karman is the cause of "true wisdom" (*prajñā*) as well as the lack of cognition (*ajñāna*) (TS 9.13).⁵⁷ Kundakunda in *Samaya-sāra* (SSā, 'The Quintessence of Doctrine') is convinced that the self as "the knower" (*ñāṇī*)

⁵⁰ M. MONIER-WILLIAMS: *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*..., p. 589.

⁵¹ pratyakṣādi-nimittaṃ.

⁵² smṛti-pratyabhijñāna-tarkānumānāgama-bhedam, PĀ 3.2.

⁵³ M. BARBATO: *Jain Approaches to Plurality: Identity as Dialogue*. Leiden—Boston 2017, p. 22. The issue of cleansing from dirt and achieving a state of being *nirmala* ('spotless,' 'clean,' 'pure') appears in many Jain texts, for instance, in *Sva-tantra-vacanāmṛta* (STVA, 'The Nectar of Instruction on Self-dependence') by Kanakasena (STVA 27). The texts have been translated by Padmanabh Jaini, who explains that: "the work belongs to the genre of the dvātriṃśikās ('philosophical compositions in thirty two verses') popular among the Jainas from the time of Siddhasena Divākara (fourth century) [...]." He continues that this text "can be considered a complete exposition of the Jaina doctrine pertaining to the freedom of the soul from the bonds of karma." P. JAINI: *Collected Papers on Jaina Studies*. Delhi 2000, pp. 83—84. Translation after P. JAINI: *Collected Papers*..., p. 90.

⁵⁴ Last two after TS, p. 218.

⁵⁵ *Sarvārtha-siddhi*.

⁵⁶ mati, śruta, avadhi, manahparyaya, kevala, TS 8.6, cf. SAS 9.1.

⁵⁷ Cf. RVār 2.6.5: jñānāvaraṇodayād ajñānam.

does not engage in doing karmas, such as knowledge-obscuring karma, which are consequences of the karmic matter, but only knows these karmas.⁵⁸

In what follows, I do not focus specifically on these distinctions but point at a variety of factors connected with cognition.

The relation between *śruta-jñāna* and *mati-jñāna* in Jinabhadra Gaṇi's perspective

Before analysing Akalaṅka's view on *mati-jñāna* and *śruta-jñāna* — in other words, the Digambara position — I will present a short summary of Śvetāmbara⁵⁹ Jinabhadra Gaṇi Kṣamāsramaṇa's perspective concerning the mutual relation between these two types of cognition in order to outline a coherent position of someone who belongs to a distinct subtradition, but who might have served as an inspiration. Jinabhadra, like RVār's author — both living in temporal proximity (6th/7th and 8th c. CE) — illuminates their inner dynamic, some subtle similarities, and obvious differences between them more thoroughly and deeply than earlier thinkers, considering the nature of such a non-absolute distinction. He proves that their sameness (*ekatā*) could be subject to reflection, because the ownership (*svāmitva*) is their convergence point: they both have the same property. However, their definitions vary, they take different places in the cause-and-effect order, and their work is connected with the medium of different senses and the functioning of the speech mechanism. Jinabhadra indicates that:

⁵⁸ *poggaladvānām pariṇāmā hoṃti nāṇa-āvaraṇā/ ṇa kodī tāṇi ādā jo jāṇadī so havadi* (3—33—101, p. 51). According to Nemichandra, the first four types of knowledge are “destructive-subsidential” (*khayauvasamiyā*), and the last one is “destructive” (*khaiyam*). Three of them, in their proper form (*saṅṅāṇatīyam*), can be transformed into an improper one (*aṅṅāṇatīyam*) through “perversion” (Pkt. *micchaa*, Skr. *mithyātva*) (GS XII 301). This precise collation is followed by the information that karman obscuring (*āvaraṇassa, āvaraṇasya*) scriptural knowledge has the same number of types (GS XII 317—318). Quite a lot of attention is given by Akalaṅka to the cognitive consequences of the eradication of karman (*kṣayāpaśama*) (cf. RVār 1.9.1—4).

⁵⁹ K. WILEY: *Supernatural Powers & Their Attainment in Jainism, Yoga Powers: Extraordinary Capacities Attained through Meditation and Concentration*. Ed. K.A. JACOBSEN. Lanham, MD, 2011, p. 150.

What is exclusively based upon evidence [is] the indirect cognition and clairvoyance etc. [is] the direct [one]. This [direct cognition] that arises out of senses or mind is empirical perception. [One could] talk about identity of sensory cognition and scriptural cognition, because of the lack of difference in the ownership etc. Although there is no difference in this [ownership], there is the difference resulting from distinct definitions. The difference between sensory cognition and scriptural cognition is the result of distinct definitions, of a cause and effect relationship, of a division between separate senses and of the difference between speech [in the case] of a speaker and other [form of cognition in the case of] the speechless (ViBh 95—97, p. 31).⁶⁰

According to Jinabhadra, whenever a word (lit. Pkt. *so*, Skr. *sa*, ViBh 98: Pkt. *śadda*, Skr. *śabda*) is the cause of *śruta-jñāna* (Pkt. *suya-kāraṇa*, Skr. *śruta-kāraṇa*) and is *śruta-jñāna* itself (Pkt. *suya*, Skr. *śruta*), the cause of the word is in *śruta-jñāna* (ViBh 99, p. 33). The living being (Pkt. *jīvo*, Skr. *jīva*) who proceeds towards scriptural cognition (Pkt. *suovayāro*, Skr. *śrutōpacāra*) does it (Pkt. *kīrai*, Skr. *kriyate*) in the absolute sense (Pkt. *paramatthao*, Skr. *paramārthato*), as that which has been heard (ViBh 99)⁶¹. Commenting on this stanza, Hemachandra (11th/12th c. CE) discriminates between the listener (*śrotṛ*) and the speaker (*vakṛ*):

The word [that is] expressed by the speaker is an instrumental cause [i.e.] the cause of scriptural cognition [that] comes to the listener and scriptural cognition, [having] the form of acquisition of that which has been heard [that] comes to the speaker when there is an act etc. of explaining, originates as the cause of this word expressed by the speaker; henceforth, proceeding towards scriptural cognition (attendance to that

⁶⁰ [Prakrit version:] *egamṭeṇa parokkhaṃ liṃgiyamohāiṃyaṃ ca paccakkhaṃ*
iṃdiya-maṇobhavaṃ jaṃ taṃ saṃvavahārapaccakkhaṃ.
sāmittāivisesābhāo maisuegayā nāma
lakkhaṇa-bheādikayaṃ nānattaṃ tayavisevevi.
lakkhaṇabheā heūphalabhāvo bheyaindiyavibhāgā
vāgakkharamūeyarabheo bheo mai-suyāṇaṃ.
 [Sanskrit *chāyā*:]
ekāntena parokṣaṃ laṅgikam avadhyādikaṃ ca pratyakṣam
indriya-manobhavaṃ yat tat saṃvyavahāra-pratyakṣam.
svāmītvādi-viśeṣābhāvād mati-śrutaikatā nāma
lakṣaṇa-bhedādi-kṛtaṃ nānātvaṃ tad-aviśeṣe'pi.
lakṣaṇa-bhedād hetu-phala-bhāvād bhedendriya-vibhāgāt
valkāṣara-mūkētara-bhedād bhedo mati-śrutayoḥ.

My own translation after Sanskrit *chāyā*.

⁶¹ *śruta-kāraṇaṃ yataḥ sa śrutaṃ ca tat-kāraṇaṃ iti tatas tasmin.*
kriyate śrutōpacāraḥ śrutaṃ tu paramārthato jīvaḥ.

which has been heard) is performed in this word which is the cause or the effect of scriptural cognition.⁶²

Jinabhadra introduces two categories: *bhāva-śruta* (Pkt. *bhāva-suya*), that is, *śruta-jñāna* limited to aspects, and *dravya-śruta* (Pkt. *davva-suya*), that is, *śruta-jñāna* limited to matter, translated by Tatia as “potential verbal knowledge” and “symbols written or spoken” respectively,⁶³ both preceded by *mati-jñāna* (ViBh 111—112, p. 37). The philosopher explains their specificity and additionally unveils the position of sensory cognition in terms of mutual references:

Whichever act of consciousness, which is caused by senses and mind, [is achieved] in accordance with *śruta-jñāna* in regard to relation between an expression and its own object, it is *bhāva-śruta*; *mati-jñāna* is the rest. If this [consciousness is] characterised by [qualities which are typical of] *śruta-jñāna*, then it is not possible in the case of one-sensed [beings]. Even when there is no *dravya-śruta*, there is [still] *bhāva-śruta*, like in the case of a dormant [person]. It is reasonable that *bhāva-śruta* can happen only in the case of someone who possesses the ability of grasping speech by the sense of hearing and would not happen in two cases of anyone else: [1] who is only focused on speech and after merely hearing. Just as there is the subtle cognition derived from this mental sense organ [that gasps] the implied meaning, even if the physical sense organ is stopped,⁶⁴ in the same way when there is no *dravya-śruta*, there is [still] *bhāva-śruta* of earth, etc. (ViBh 100—103, pp. 33—34).⁶⁵

⁶² Commentary to ViBh 99, s. 33.

[...] sa śabdo vaktrābhīdhīyamānaḥ śrotṛ-gatasya śruta-jñānasya kāraṇaṃ nimittaṃ bhavati, śrutam ca vaktr-gata-śrutōpayoga-rūpaṃ vyākhyāna-karaṇādau tasya vaktrābhīdhīyamānasya śabdasya kāraṇaṃ jāyate, ity atas tasmin śruta-jñānasya kāraṇa-bhūte kārya-bhūte vā śabde śrutōpacāraḥ kriyate.

⁶³ N. TATIA: *Studies in Jaina Philosophy...*, p. 51.

⁶⁴ Terminology after: J. SINHA: *Indian Psychology Perception*. London—New York 2013, p. 2.

⁶⁵ [Prakrit version:] iṃḍiya-maṇonimittaṃ jaṃ viṇṇāṇaṃ suyāṇusāreṇaṃ niyayatthuttisamatthaṃ taṃ bhāvasuyaṃ māi sesaṃ.
jai suyalakkhaṇameyaṃ to na tamegiṃḍiyāṇa sambhavai
davvasuyā(gu)māvammi vi bhāvasuyaṃ suttajaiṇo vva.
bhāvasuyaṃ bhāsā-soyaladdhiṇo jujjāe na iyarassa
bhāsābhīmuḥassa jayaṃ sauṇa ya jaṃ havejjāhi.
jaha suhubhaṃ bhāvīṃḍiyāṇaṃ davviṃḍiyāvarohe vi
taha davvasuyābhāve bhāvasuyaṃ patthivāiṇaṃ.

[Sanskrit chāyā:] indriya-mano-nimittaṃ yad vijñānaṃ śrutānusāreṇa
nijakārthhōkti-samarthe tad bhāva-śrutam matih śeṣam.

yadi śruta-lakṣaṇam etat tato na tad ekēndriyāṇaṃ sambhavati.

In the concepts of *bhāva-śruta* and *dravya-śruta*, there is the echo of the division between *upayoga* ('cognitive faculties') and *labdhi* ('actual use of a sense organ') (TS 2.18). The first kind of scriptural cognition should be understood as the ability to understand a text; the second one, as a material text, brought to someone's attention as a physical and textual medium. This distinction may also refer to the difference between the ability to speak and spoken words. One-sensed creatures serve as an example of living beings which have faculties to understand but do not have the understanding itself. In the commentary to this passage, the word *saṃketa* ('convention') plays an important role "in the context of [relating] an utterance (a terminated statement) with its own object." In ViBh 104, Jinabhadra raises the question of karman veiling sensory and scriptural cognition, and then he explains what the "precedence" of one form of cognition over the other means:

It is said that *śruta* is preceded by *mati* and *mati* [is] not preceded by *śruta*, this is the difference. [*Śruta* is] "preceded" [by *mati*], because of the state of filling up and protecting which *mati* [has in the reference to] it (*śruta*). [What] is filled up is attained and given by *mati* and not by non-*mati*. And what is protected by *mati*, is grasped; otherwise, it (*śruta*) would disappear (ViBh 105—106, p. 35).⁶⁶

Jinabhadra expresses the view — different from that of Umāsvāmi — that *mati-jñāna* in a particular way precedes *śruta-jñāna* as a protector that guards ancient texts. This stanza can be interpreted as a reference to the Purāṇas (4th—5th c. CE)⁶⁷ written to strengthen the significance or even superiority of the Jaina canon. The philosopher continues:

dravya-śrutābhāve'pi bhāva-śrutam suptayater iva.
bhāva-śrutam bhāṣā-śrotra-labdhimato yujyate nētarasya
bhāṣābhimukhasya yat śrutvā ca yad bhavetām.
yathā sūkṣmaṃ bhāvēndriya-jñānaṃ dravyēndriyāvarodhe'pi
tathā dravya-śrutābhāve bhāva-śrutam pṛthvy-ādīnām. The fragment
bhāva-śrutam bhāṣā-śrotra... has been translated with invaluable help
of Filip Ruciński, PhD candidate of the Department of Oriental Studies
(University of Warsaw).

⁶⁶ [Prakrit version:] mai-puvvaṃ suya-muttaṃ na māi suya-puvviyā viseso'yam
puvvaṃ pūraṇa-pālana-bhāvāo jaṃ māi tassa.
pūrijjai pāvijjai dijjai vā jaṃ māie nā'mainā
pālijjai ya māie gahiyam iharā paṇassejjā.

[Sanskrit chāyā:] mati-pūrvam śrutam uktaṃ na matiḥ śruta-pūrvikā, viśeṣo'yam
pūrvam pūraṇa-pālana-bhāvād yad matis tasya. Cf. Jain (2006: 18).
pūryate prāpyate dīyate vā yad matyā nāmatyā
pālyate ca matyā gṛhītam itarathā praṇāśyet.

⁶⁷ Dated after U. SINGH: *A History of Ancient and Early Medieval India: From the Stone Age to the 12th Century*. Delhi—Tokyo 2008, p. 22. Słuszkiewicz dates it

Cognition and not cognition have the same time. Because [it is said] ‘*mati-śrute*’ [at the same time], therefore [1] *śruta* [in a way] is not preceded by *mati*, or else [2], non-cognizance of *śruta* is comprised within *mati-jñāna*. [...] Whatever *mati* you all have after hearing, it is preceded by *śruta*; therefore there is no difference [between them]. This *mati* has its source in *dravya-śruta* and is not caused by *bhāva-śruta* (ViBh 107, 109, p. 36).⁶⁸

Jinabhadra explains that the only kind of *śruta-jñāna* that precedes *mati-jñāna* is *dravya-śruta*, that is, texts understood as the material basis for written knowledge. His attitude is explicitly sophisticated, because he makes an attempt to describe in a detailed manner numerous aspects of *mati* and *śruta* mutual relations, taking into account their multilayered nature. The problem of one form of cognition preceding the other, their interlocked but not overlapping scopes, and a juxtaposition of living beings characterised by various levels of cognitive skills could serve as preeminent examples.

Akalaṅka’s approach on the basis of RVār

Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa concentrates on the relation between sensory cognition and scriptural cognition in several treatises: LT, *Nyāya-viniścaya* (NV, ‘An Ascertainment of Logic’), *Siddhi-viniścaya* (SV, ‘The Ascertainment of Perfection’), *Pramāṇa-saṃgraha* (PS, ‘A Compendium of Cognitive Criteria’), and RVār. This subject matter turns out to be of great importance to him. In his commentaries to various texts, he tries to encapsulate, elaborate on, and clarify previous achievements in the field of Jain epis-

back to 4th—14th c. CE. E. SŁUSZKIEWICZ: *Pradzieje i legendy Indii*. Warszawa 1980, p. 399.

⁶⁸ [Prakrit version:] ṇāṇāṇaṇṇāṇāṇi ya samakālāiṃ jao mai-suyāiṃ
to na suyam mai-puvvaṃ maiṇāṇe vā suyannāṇam. [...]
soṅṇa jā māi bhe sā suyapuvva tti teṇa na viśeso
sā davvasuyappabhavā bhāvasuyāo māi natthi.

[Sanskrit chāyā:] jñāne ajñāne ca sama-kāle yato mati-śrute
tato na śrutam mati-pūrvam mati-jñāne vā śrutājñānam. [...]
śrutvā yā matir bhavatām sā śruta-pūrvvēti tena na viśeṣaḥ
sā dravya-śruta-prabhavā bhāva-śrutād matir nāsti. This passage has been
consulted (in some aspects) with Filip Ruciński.

temology, earning himself a position of an authority and inspiration for his intellectual successors, such as Māṇikyanandin. Thanks to enormous specificity of his texts, figurativeness of comparisons, and consistency, he extends the knowledge of many levels of human cognitive activity. In the first chapter of LT, Akalaṅka explains that the four levels of sensory cognition and their further subdivisions are the basis for the theory of perception (LT 1.5—6). Perception appears diversified due to differences⁶⁹ and is characterised with the help of the category of “vividness” (*vaiśadyam*) (LT 1.4, cf. PS 1.2). Later, in the fourth chapter, the philosopher recognises perception (*pratyakṣa*) as one of two types of cognition alongside indirect cognition (*parokṣa*) (LT 4.61, cf. NV 3.474). Both of them have their own varieties, such as: cognition of sense objects (*indriyārtha-jñāna*),⁷⁰ non-sensory perception (*anindriya-pratyakṣa*),⁷¹ and supersensory perception (*atīndriya-pratyakṣa*)⁷² in the case of the former and scriptural cognition (*śruta-jñāna*)⁷³ in the case of the latter (LT 4.61, cf. PS 1.2). Scriptural cognition is considered by this Digambara⁷⁴ author as a cognitive criterion (LT 4.26, SV 10.3⁷⁵). In PS, he argues that it is something which “is not confused” (*aviplava*) and which is caused by perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), and tradition (*āgama*) (PS 1.2).

Akalaṅka attaches importance to the outer world, treating external objects (*bahir-artha*) as effective (*artha-kriyākāra*, ‘[something] which performs action with a special purpose’), in contrast to ideas (*vikalpā*) (NV 68—69).⁷⁶ Sensory and scriptural types of cognition grasp each element of this objective reality in their own way.

The most complex elaboration of this issue is to be found in RVār, the commentary to TS containing its in-depth analysis. Akalaṅka claims that sensory cognition and scriptural cognition are very close to each other thanks to the sequential order of their occurrence⁷⁷ and to the fact that both

⁶⁹ atirekeṇa viśeṣa-pratibhāsa.

⁷⁰ It is clear (*spaṣṭa*), limited (*pradeśika*), and of indistinct nature (*avagraha*), directed (*īha*), determinative (*avāya*), and focused (*dhāraṇā*) (LT 4.61).

⁷¹ It is of the nature of memory (*smṛti*), recognition (*saṃjñā*), and association (*cintā*); it is determinate cognition (*abhinibodha*) (LT 4.61). Akalaṅka claims that scriptural cognition always comes after sensory cognition (*mati*), recognition (*saṃjñā*), or association (*cintā*) (LT 3.10).

⁷² It is of the nature of settled determination (*vyavasāya*) (LT 4.61).

⁷³ It consists of presumption (*arthāpatti*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), etc. (LT 4.61).

⁷⁴ P. DUNDAS: *The Jains...*, p. 337.

⁷⁵ D. MALVANIA, J. SONI: “Jain Philosophy...,” p. 304.

⁷⁶ Cf. D. MALVANIA, J. SONI: “Jain Philosophy...,” p. 286).

⁷⁷ tad-anamṭaram tat-pūrvakatvāt, RVār 1.9.14.

may have any substance as their object (RVār 1.26.4). Selected passages of RVār, analysed below, describe their mutual relations (especially a succession of one after the other, their scopes, and their potential errors) and points of difference between them.

Sensory cognition as the basis for scriptural cognition according to RVār

The idea presented above in the context of Jinabhadra's work, namely, that one cognition precedes the other, is raised primarily in TS in the form of the statement: "Scriptural [cognition], preceded by sensory [cognition], is of two, of twelve or many kinds" (TS 1.20).⁷⁸ Akalaṅka provides the appropriate commentary to it, using the metaphor of transformation (*pariṇāma*) during which a pot is created by a potter with the help of a pottery wheel. This image of the multifactorial process is also used in other Jain texts, for instance, in Vidyānandi's *Satya-śāsana-parīkṣā* (SŚP, 'The Analysis of the True Instruction,' 9th c. CE). The author of RVār traces the following image:

Clay itself possesses factors such as a stick, a potter's wheel, human effort, etc., exclusively, in view of transformation which takes place inside a pot [made of] clay, because even when [these] instrumental causes, such as the stick etc., are present, a lump of clay formed of small pieces etc. does not itself become a pot, because there is no internal impulse for transformation in it, which [would lead to] coming into being of the pot; therefore, the lump of clay becomes exactly a pot, thanks to the presence of internal transformation dependent on external factors, such as the stick, etc., and not on the stick etc. [The factors such as] the stick etc. [are] exclusively instrumental causes (RVār 1.20.4).⁷⁹

Clay is the material cause here, the potter, the wheel, and the stick are the instrumental causes. The key word defining the specificity of connect-

⁷⁸ śrutam mati-pūrvam dvy-āneka-dvādaśa-bhedam.

⁷⁹ All translations were produced with advice from Prof. Piotr Balcerowicz. yathā mṛdaḥ svayam antar-ghaṭa-bhavana-pariṇāmābhīmukhye daṇḍa-cakra-pauruṣeya-prayat-nādi-nimitta-mātram bhavati, yataḥ satsv api daṇḍādi-nimittesu śarkarādi-pracito mṛt-piṇḍaḥ svayam antar-ghaṭa-bhavana-pariṇāma-nirutsukatvān na ghaṭī bhavati, ato mṛt-piṇḍa eva bāhya-daṇḍādi-nimittāpekṣābhyantara-pariṇāma-sānnidhyād ghaṭo bhavati na daṇḍādayaḥ, iti daṇḍādīnām nimitta-mātratvaṃ.

ing clay with different causal factors is “itself” (*svayam*) appearing in the context of its own impossibility of undergoing self-reliant transformation, because of the lack of appropriate force. This particular image is presented by Akalaṅka in order to explain the way human cognitive faculties, narrowed to the concurrence of *mati-jñāna* and *śruta-jñāna*, function. The second part of the passage is as follows:

And similarly the soul itself possesses factors such as *mati-jñāna* exclusively in view of transformation which takes place inside *śruta-jñāna*, because even when a believer is present, there is a reliance on the sense of hearing, and where there is proximity of an instruction concerning the meaning of words from an external teacher, *śruta-jñāna* itself does not appear, because there is no internal impulse, [which would lead to] *śruta-jñāna* that [has been] generated under the influence of karman fruition obscuring *śruta-jñāna*. Hence the soul, which possesses *mati-jñāna* etc. as external, becomes *śruta-jñāna*, in view of internal transformation which leads to *śruta-jñāna* that has been generated thanks to a partial destruction and a partial suppression of karman obscuring *śruta-jñāna*, but it is not true that *mati-jñāna* has transformation into *śruta-jñāna*, because it is only the instrumental cause (RVār 1.20.4).⁸⁰

Akalaṅka argues that the human self is internally limited in the same way as clay: it needs the help of *mati-jñāna* to make *śruta-jñāna* function. This passage displays main factors of this process, including subsidence and destruction of *karman*, both being important restrictions. The role of *mati-jñāna*, as the author of RVār stresses, is crucial but is not exclusive. The whole parallel reveals the main restrictions of scriptural cognition. Cognitive processes do not run in isolation. They are supported by auxiliary agents and disturbed by disruptive ones. Although these two kinds of cognition are not identical and there is no transformation of one into the other, scriptural cognition, dependent on sensory cognition due to the cause-and-effect order, is several times more constricted by adopting the restrictions of its predecessor as well as its own ones.

⁸⁰ tathā paryāyi-paryāyayoḥ syād anyatvād ātmanaḥ svayam antaḥ śruta-bhavana-pariṇāmābhimukhye mati-jñānaṃ nimitta-mātraṃ bhavati, yataḥ saty api samyag-dṛṣṭeḥ śrotrēndriya-balādhāne bāhyācārya-padārthopadeśa-sannidhāne ca śruta-jñānāvarenaḥodayavaśo-kṛtasya svayam antaḥ śrūta-bhavana-nirutsukatvād ātmano na śrutam bhavati, ato bāhya-mati-jñānādi-nimittāpekṣātmaivābhyantara-śruta-jñānāvarena-kṣayōpaśamāpādita-śruta-bhavana-pariṇāmābhimukhyāt śrutī (śrutam) bhavati, na mati-jñānasya śrutī (śruta)-bhavanam asti, tasya nimitta-mātratvāt. The passage *paryāyi-paryāyayoḥ syād anyatvād* is probably a gloss.

The scope of cognition according to RVār

Umāsvāmi's thesis, that "the scope of sensory cognition and scriptural cognition encompasses [all] substances, but does not [encompass] all their modes" (TS 1.26),⁸¹ indicates emphatically the boundaries within which both types of cognition operate, reliant on many independent factors, such as the work of sense organs, limitations of human cognitive abilities, and, finally, the level of karman's fruition. Scriptural cognition, having a word as its base, is not able to encompass all modes through its scope and thereby is incapable of leading to the fullness of cognition. In the case of sensory cognition, physical characteristics, such as the shape of an eye, matter, and expected measurements, qualities, etc., are a serious limitation — the eye grasps all colors of substance, but only colors. In order to define what both forms of cognition do to grasp things, Akalaṅka uses the verb *āskandanti* ($\sqrt{\text{āskand}}$), which should be translated as 'to attack.' In reference to substances and their modes, the philosopher uses two expressions: "[These substances], which achieve the state of being an object"⁸² and "[they] are made objects,"⁸³ so he uses verbs in active and passive voice, rendering *viṣaya* ('an object') the focal notion of the description of this process, because it is the object that triggers *mati-jñāna* to make *śruta-jñāna* work. The ramifications are complex, because modes, as the author of RVār writes, are countable, uncountable, and of infinite number, and their kinds are multifarious. Akalaṅka explains Umāsvāmi's statement "Grasping not all the modes in order to detail these [substances],"⁸⁴ pertaining to human cognition abilities, in the following way:

There is the use of the phrase "not all the modes" in order to detail these [substances], because [without such emphasis] there would be an unwanted consequence that sensory cognition and scriptural cognition are in relation to their object, [which is] all these substances altogether (along with all modes). These substances which achieve the state of being an object of sensory cognition and scriptural cognition enter this state of [being] the object exclusively together with some of their modes, but not with all of them, and also not with the infinite number [of them]. How does it happen? In this case, sensory cognition [is] conditioned by an organ [taking the form] of an eye etc., [and] it has a color for its basis etc. It grasps colors etc., which are in this sub-

⁸¹ *mati-śrutayor nibandho dravyeṣv asarva-paryāyeṣu.*

⁸² *viṣaya-bhāvam āpadyamānāni.*

⁸³ *viṣayī-kriyante.*

⁸⁴ *tad-viśeṣaṅgārtham asarva-paryāya-grahaṇam.*

stance, but not all modes, which [are exactly] in it, [it] is based exactly on [these] experiencing spheres of the eye etc., scriptural cognition in turn has a word for its basis. And all words are just countable and modes of substances again are divided into countable, uncountable, and infinite — not all of them become later objects of scriptural cognition in view of the detailed form (RVār 1.26.4)⁸⁵.

Akalaṅka clearly explains that the limitation on the number of modes is significant as it reveals a conviction of Jain thinkers that cognitive functions are specialised. Both forms of cognition have access to substance, but each of them has its own basis for it. For *mati-jñāna*, only sensory data are accessible; for *śruta-jñāna*, a linguistic unit. The number of words is exhaustible, and that is why the image of reality consisting of innumerable modal configurations is restricted. A human being is capable of cognising a number of relations and systems with the help of sensory cognition, and scriptural cognition performs operations on these data related to its own limitations; hence, the human cognitive apparatus is forced to make advanced selections in order to elicit the linguistic image of the world.

Possibility of error according to RVār

In the middle of the discussion of both forms of cognition, the author of RVār considers the possibility of their being wrong, compares wrong apprehension (*mithya-darśana*) to an alchemical workshop (*varcogr̥ha*), and points to the necessity to use some transmogrifying substance (*vipariṇāma-dravya*) prerequisite for changing jewels into something else. To Akalaṅka, the presence of karman, which obscures scriptural cognition, is important, as knowledge provided by this form of cognition is guaranteed by calming some part of it and destroying the other one. Karman effectively blocks the mechanism of *śruta-jñāna*, as well as *mati-jñāna*,⁸⁶ even if different factors activating this type of cognition are present, such as listening to words of an

⁸⁵ teṣāṃ dravyāṇāṃ aviśeṣeṇa mati-śrutayor viṣaya-bhāva-prasaṅge tad-viśeṣaṇārthaṃ asarva-paryāya-grahaṇaṃ kriyate. tāni dravyāṇi mati-śrutayor viṣaya-bhāvam āpadyamānāni katipayair eva paryāyair viṣaya-bhāvam āskandanti na sarva-paryāyair anantair apāpi. tat katham? iha matiḥ cakṣur-ādi-karaṇa-nimittā rūpādy ālambanā, sā yasmin dravye rūpādayo vartante na tatra sarvān paryāyān eva gṛhṇāti, cakṣur-ādi-viṣayān evālambate. śrutam api śabda-liṅgaṃ, śabdās ca sarve saṃkhyeyā eva dravya-paryāyāḥ punaḥ saṃkhyeyāsaṃkhyeyānanta-bhedāḥ, na te sarve viśeṣākāreṇa tair viṣayī-kriyante.

⁸⁶ mati-śruta-jñānāvaraṇa-kṣayōpaśamo mati-śrute.

external authority or a properly working organ of hearing. The philosopher refers to Umāsvāmi's statement: "Sensory cognition, scriptural cognition [and] clairvoyance [can be] erroneous cognitions"⁸⁷ (TS 1.31), pondering:

Erroneous [cognition] means false [cognition]. Why? Because there is a rule [defining what is] right. The word "and" means a set. [Sensory cognition, scriptural cognition and clairvoyance] are erroneous, and also proper. Whence in turn their erroneousness?⁸⁸

Each thing has to transmogrify in order to change. Error is the effect of invoking false apprehension implied by an inappropriate process of transformation:

Hence, there is the state of being in a different manner, because the real thing, transmogrifying, has particular power. As it is possible for a substance of gourd to change (lit. spoil) milk, similarly, wrong apprehension is sufficient dilute sensory cognition etc., because when it appears, [an apprehension] in the form of a metaphorical description in another way is to be observed. An alchemical workshop is not able to lead to a transformation of jewels etc., but if there are transformational substances in proximity, their transformation actually appears. Again when the right apprehension appears, then there is the correctness of these [types of cognition: indirect, verbal, and clairvoyance] because of the lack of the transformation of that vision; hence, there is an alternative to the division of these three because of the peculiar process of fruition through right vision and false vision: sensory cognition (due to right vision) [and] false sensory cognition (due to wrong vision), verbal cognition [and] false verbal cognition, clairvoyance [and] false (lit. 'broken') cognition (RVār 1.31.3).⁸⁹

Akalañka's concept of the necessity of power that participates in the transmogrification of an object is the key to understanding cognitive com-

⁸⁷ mati-śrutāvadhayo viparyayaś ca.

⁸⁸ viparyayo mithyēty arthaḥ. kutaḥ? samyag-adhikārāt. ca śabdaḥ samuccayārthaḥ, viparyayaś ca samyak cēti. kutaḥ punar eṣāṃ viparyayaḥ?

⁸⁹ pariñāmakasya hi vastunaḥ śakti-viśeṣād anyathā bhāvo bhavati. yathā alābū-dravyaṃ dugdhaṃ vipariñāmayitum śaknoti tathā mithyā-darśanam api maty-ādinām anyathātvaṃ kartum alaṃ tad-udaye anyathāni rūpaṇa-darśanāt. varcogṛhaṃ tu maṇy-ādinām vikāraṃ nōtpādayitum alam, vipariñāmaka-dravya-sannidhāne teṣāṃ api bhavaty evānyathātvaṃ, yadā tu samyag-darśanam prādurbhūtam tadā mithyā-pariñāma-darśanābhāvāt (mithyā-darśana-pariñām ābhāvāt) teṣāṃ maty-ādinām samyaktvaṃ, ataḥ samyag-darśana-mithyā-darśanōdaya-viśeṣāt teṣāṃ trayāṇāṃ dvidhā kṣptir bhavati mati-jñānam maty-ajñānam śruta-jñānam śrutājñānam avadhi-jñānam vibhaṅga-jñānam iti.

plexity of human beings. The whole idea is interlinked with the problem of demonstrable cognitive limitations and a risk of cognitive opacity leading to the misapprehension of reality. Error or correctness of scriptural cognition are dependent on the contact between a sense and a substance, which, according to the Jain philosophy, is inherently related with an infinite number of modes (*paryāya*); hence, the boundaries of this cognition result from the infinite complexity of each entity and the infinite number of ways leading to its grasping.

Why *mati* and *śruta* as forms of cognition are not identical?

Akalaṅka dwells on Umāsvāmi's enumeration of types of cognition,⁹⁰ presenting — in the form of a juxtaposition of two different standpoints — the possibility of notional identity (*ekatvam*) between sensory cognition and scriptural cognition and meticulously refuting it. Again, he refers to the assumption that there is the cause-and-effect order responsible for their activation and functioning:

[An opponent:] Sensory cognition and scriptural cognition elicit resemblance. In what way? Because of the lack of difference [in the form of] concomitance and occupation of the same place. [The Jain point of view:] [But it is] not [like that], because the way of acquiring one [of them differs from the means of acquiring] the other. [...] And because of [the fact that scriptural cognition] is preceded by it [sensory cognition] (RVār 1.9.21—23).⁹¹

The author of RVār clarifies the reason for considering both types of cognition as different in respect of their modes of functioning and their dependence on distinct causes:

[The opponent says:] If it is so, i.e. [scriptural cognition is] preceded by sensory cognition, the lack of difference [between them would result] from that. Why? Because the effect is similar to the cause. In what way? In the same way as in the case of a thread and a cloth. As the substance of the cloth, which is the result of white etc. threads, possesses exactly the quality of whiteness, in a similar way also

⁹⁰ *mati-śrutāvadhi-maṇḥparyaya-kevalāni jñānam* (TS 1.9).

⁹¹ *mati-śrutayor ekatvam prāpnoti. kutaḥ? sāhacaryāt, ekatrāvasthānāc cāvīṣeṣāt. na; atas tat siddheḥ. [...] tat-pūrvakatvāc ca [...].*

scriptural cognition, which is the result of sensory cognition, consists of the nature of sensory cognition. And their operation is simultaneous. Like simultaneous operation of warmth and radiance is [present] in fire, in a similar way, immediately after the manifestation of right vision, there is no difference between sensory cognition and scriptural cognition [operating] simultaneously, because cognising and defining [is their] operation. [The Jain point of view:] But it is not so. What is the reason for that? [The reason is that] there is a difference [between them], because the similarity of causes and the simultaneousness of operational [modes] is questioned; hence, the difference has been settled on that basis (RVār 1.9.24).⁹²

Akalaṅka refers here to the viewpoint of the opponent who considers both forms of cognition as identical. He uses the metaphor of the cloth sewn with the help of white threads to visualise the problematic image of their contact, making an attempt to mark out boundaries between these two types of cognition and trying to understand the opponent's presupposition:

[The opponent:] The identity of sensory cognition and scriptural cognition would be a consequence of the lack of the difference of [their] scopes, because it has been said: "The scope of sensory cognition and scriptural cognition encompasses [all] substances, but does not [encompass] all their modes" (RVār 1.9.25).⁹³

Somewhat later, he draws the conclusion that the ways of grasping an object are different in each case, and that this very factor preordains their distinctness:

[The Jain point of view:] But it is not so. Why? Because of the difference in [the way of] grasping. Because grasping [an object] happens in a different way with the help of sensory cognition, and in a different way with the help of scriptural cognition. For [that person] who thinks: "The lack of the difference [between two cognitions] results from the lack of the difference in [their] scope" there would be the lack of dif-

⁹² syād etat yato mati-pūrvakatvam ata evāviśeṣaḥ. kutaḥ? kāraṇa-sadṛśatvāt kāryasya. katham? tantu-ṭaṭavat. yathā śuklādi-tantu-kāryaṃ ṭaṭa-dravyaṃ śuklādi-guṇaṃ eva, tathā mati-kāryatvāc chrūtasyāpi maty-ātmakatvam. yugapad-vṛtteś ca. yathā agnau auṣṇya-prakāśanayor yugapad-vṛtteḥ agny-ātmakatvam, tathā samyag-darśanāvīrbhāvād anantaraṃ yugapan-mati-śrūtayor jñāna-vyapadeśa-vṛtter aviśeṣa iti; tan na; kiṃ kāraṇaṃ? ata eva nānātvāt. yata eva kāraṇa-sadṛśatvaṃ yugapad-vṛttiś ca codyate ata eva nānātvaṃ siddhaṃ.

⁹³ syād etat viśayāviśeṣāt mati-śrūtayor ekatvaṃ evaṃ hi vakṣye *"mati-śrūtayor ni-bandho dravyeṣv asarva-paryāyeṣu"? iti.

ference in the case of seeing and touching the object [in the form of] one pot (RVār 1.9.25).⁹⁴

The Jain philosopher argues that assuming a common scope (*viṣaya*) for both types of cognition as a decisive factor prejudging their identity goes too far, because even if they have the same object, their ways of achieving it, that is, their modes or patterns of cognising it, are different. The second explanation for insisting that they are identical is the fact that for the opponent, they have the same instrumental cause. The author of RVār underlines that:

[The opponent:] The identity would result from the [fact], that mind and senses are the instrumental cause of both [cognitions]. Mind and senses are the instrumental cause of sensory cognition; and scriptural cognition is recognised thanks to language of the speaker and the eye of the listener and thanks to the internal organ — these two factors are its cause. [The Jain point of view:] But it is not so. Why? For the reason that it has not been proved. Because a tongue is helpful in uttering words, but not in cognising [things], an ear is helpful in the direct cognition of its (own) object, but not in scriptural cognition, so it has not been proved that these two [factors] are the cause (RVār 1.9.26).⁹⁵

Akalaṅka systematically excludes successive arguments for the identity of these two kinds of cognition, displaying each time their weakness and insufficiency. He defends Umāsvāmi's thesis through an artful endeavour of incorporating the opponent's arguments into his elaboration, and this strategy enables him to present the Jaina viewpoint amongst the multiplicity of opinions. The lack of such identity, resulting from distinctive perspectives and scopes, alternative ways of acquiring these forms of cognition, and different causes and operational modes, is an inhibitor as well as an amplifying factor for *śruta-jñāna*. Even organs of sense, such as a tongue or an ear, necessary in the process of speaking and hearing, are not sufficient for activating this particular cognition, as it needs other sophisticated tools to come about (cf. the role of meaning).

⁹⁴ tan na, kiṃ kāraṇam? grahaṇa-bhedāt. anyathā hi matyā gr̥hyate anyathā śrutena. yo hi manyate 'viṣayābhedād aviśeṣaḥ' iti tasya eka-ghaṭa-viṣaya-darśana-sparśanāviśeṣaḥ syāt.

⁹⁵ syād etat ubhayor indriyānindriya-nimittatvād ekatvam. mati-jñānaṃ tāvat indriyānindriya-nimittam iti pratītam śrutam api vaktṛ-śrotṛ-jihvā-śravaṇa-nimittatvād antaḥkaraṇa-nimittatvac ca tad-ubhaya-nimittam iti; tan na; kiṃ kāraṇam? asiddhatvāt. jihvā hi śabdōccāra-kriyāyāḥ nimittam na jñānasya, śravaṇam api svaviṣaya-mati-jñāna-nimittam na śrūtasya, ity ubhaya-nimittatvam asiddham. siddho hi hetuḥ sādhyam artham sādhyen nāsiddhaḥ. kin nimittam tarhi śrutam?

Other limiting factors

Scriptures (*āgama*) are based on the perceptive cognition (*pratyakṣa-jñāna*) of their authors (RVār 1.12.7) due to their individual mode of language usage (RVār 5.24.2—5).⁹⁶ The word (*śabda*), being the basis for scriptural cognition, is called “heard” (*śruta*), because it is “the word of tradition” (*rūḍhi-śabda*) but “the attainment of scriptural cognition is in everything preceded by sensory cognition.”⁹⁷ The words themselves micromanage the description of substance (RVār 2.8.18). Scriptural cognition is what may be heard (*śruyate sma*) “when there are internal and external causes, [such as] destruction and subsidence etc., of scripture-veiling karman.”⁹⁸ Karman is a severe limiting factor. It takes different forms, depending on the type of living being (animal, human being). The process of its disposal is usually complex (RVār 2.5.5—6, 6.5). Scriptural cognition may be erroneous, like “milk in a guard is spoiled.”⁹⁹ There are the important differences between the reception of language by the speaker and the listener. Scriptural cognition, which is not directed towards senses (*no’indriya-prādhānyāt*) but towards mind (*anindriya*) (RVār 1.9.28), can function even if there is “no operation of the sense of hearing”¹⁰⁰; this kind of grasping (*avabodha*) takes place through comprehension (*adhigama*), hint (*upāya*), and finding the real nature (*yāthātmyena*), but the data are attainable only through the medium of perspective and different means (*nayādibhir*) (RVār 1.9.30). Each fragment of scriptural cognition has its beginning (*ādimat*) and, as a result, is not infinite, although language itself is beginningless (*anādi*) (RVār 1.20.7). It needs time to operate (RVār 5.17.36) and is dependent on matter in its two forms: as substance (*dravya-vacana*) and state (*bhāva-vacana*) (RVār 5.19.15—17).¹⁰¹ Scriptural knowledge cannot be combined with omniscience, which is exclusive (*eka*) to the omniscient soul (RVār 1.30.10).

All these passages show numerous boundaries of language and scriptural cognition which form a part of the intrinsic cognitive mechanism of each self.

⁹⁶ D. MALVANIA, J. SONI: “Jain Philosophy...,” p. 404.

⁹⁷ sarva-mati-purvasya śrutatva-siddhir bhavati, RVār 1.20.6.

⁹⁸ śrutāvaraṇa-kṣayōpaśamādy-antar-aṅga-bahir-aṅga-hetu-sannidhāne sati, RVār 1.9.2.

⁹⁹ alābū-dugdhavad duṣyanti, RVār 1.31.2.

¹⁰⁰ śrotrēndriya-vyāpāram antareṇa.

¹⁰¹ Cf. D. MALVANIA, J. SONI: “Jain Philosophy...,” p. 392.

Conclusions

The above passages of RVār are an excellent basis for illumination of *śruta-jñāna*'s boundaries, taking into account various aspects of its activity, such as cognising, defining, and detailing objects.

The relation between sensory cognition and scriptural cognition in Akalaṅka's perspective (representative for Jainism) is unique in the context of all other types of cognition (clairvoyance, telepathy, omniscience). No other two among them have a similar, strictly mutual correspondence, as in contrast to them, they are not acquired through the senses and the mind, and they operate on different material (clairvoyance is focused on physical objects that are not to be grasped in the process of sensory or scriptural cognition; telepathy, on the mental objects of other people,¹⁰² where mind is present "incidentally"¹⁰³; and omniscience, on all substances and all modes at all times, in material and non-material configurations). Hence, scriptural cognition is limited to a snippet of reality, confined in addition to the boundaries delimited by sensory cognition. The Jain concept of five kinds of cognition is closely associated with the concept of the self (unacknowledged in the Buddhist theory), which imposes a way of interpreting the mechanisms of their functioning. From a reverse perspective, the perceptibility of the sole self is unavailable to sensory or scriptural cognition. This ability, as Akalaṅka stresses, is a feature of the last three types of cognition, where clairvoyance and telepathy grasp the self that is "bodily framed dependent on a karmic bond" (*karma-bandha-paratantra-piṇḍātman*) and omniscience — the cleansed one (*śuddha*) (RVār 2.8.18).

Although this relation is firmly established, cognising the reality through words and through senses is a matter of separate acts (that viewpoint being in opposition to other Indian thinkers, such as Bhartṛhari, the adepts of Mīmāṃsā school, etc.).

¹⁰² "Whatever objects are noticed by the extrasensory type of awareness are noticed in a relatively purer fashion by the telepathic type. Extrasensory awareness notices all the tangible substances situated within the confines of the entire universe, whereas telepathy only grasps certain tangible objects situated within the region of the universe that is inhabited by human beings. Similarly, extrasensory awareness is available to a person whether he is disciplined or not, whereas telepathy can only be experienced by a disciplined person. Lastly, extrasensory awareness can notice any aspect of tangible objects, whereas telepathy cognizes only one part (i.e. the part available to human beings)". Commentary to TSBh 1.26—29 in: D. MALVANIA, J. SONI: "Jain Philosophy...", pp. 73—74.

¹⁰³ RVār 1.9.5. Term "incidentally" after D. MALVANIA, J. SONI: "Jain Philosophy...", p. 326.

Several factors that limit scriptural cognition are to be distinguished in RVār: its dependency on the operative power of sensory cognition, its incapability of grasping and exposing the wholeness of reality, its state of being jeopardised by the possibility of error, the need of transformational agents, the restricted means of its attainment, the strong and stable influence of karman upon it, a specific way of grasping an object, and the limitations of the sole word (for instance, a word or an utterance always denote simultaneously positive and negative aspects of a thing¹⁰⁴). These restrictions play a specific role: they help the limited human mind cope with the multifarious data and arrange them in a logical order. They point to the way in which human beings describe the world: the description is partial and reliant on advanced processes combining sensory contact, auxiliary factors, and linguistic modelling of data. As *śruta-jñāna* is strongly associated with words, further conclusions concerning the limitations of language itself can be drawn. The language of scriptures and their content are based on sensory data received and processed by their authors. That is why they may be enriched with multifarious information and endowed with wisdom, but these aspects would not make them comprehensive and total.

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- LT = Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa: *Laghīyas-traya*. Ed. M.K. SHASTRI. *Akalaṅka-grantha-traya*. Singhi Jain Series 12. Ahmedabad, Sañcālaka-singhī Jaina Granthamālā, 1939.
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- PĀ = Māñīkyaṇandin: *Parīkṣāmukha*, in PĀLV and PKM.

¹⁰⁴ sarvasya vāg-arthasya vidhi-pratiṣedhātmakatvāt. RVār 1.8.18.

- PĀLV = Anantavīrya: *Parīkṣāmukha-laghu-vṛtti*. Ed. R. JAINA. Dativā, Bhāratavarṣīya Anekānta Vidvat Pariṣad, 1992.
- PKM = Prabhācandra: *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa*. Ed. M. SASTRI. Delhi, Sri Garib Dass Oriental Series, Sri Satguru Publications, 1990.
- RVār = Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa: *Tattvārtha-sūtra-rāja-vārttika*. Ed. M. JAIN. *Tattvārthavārtikam [rāja-vārtikam]*. Hindī anuvāda sahita. Kāśī: Bhāratīya Jñānapīṭha, Vārāṇasī, Bhāratīya Jñānapīṭha Prakāśana, 1953.
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