Dobro a wolność. Wokół teorii możliwości Marthy Nussbaum



Abstract

The paper addresses some of the aspects of the neo-Aristotelian concept of good on the basis of Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. The author’s general thesis is that the idea of good organizes its normativity along two vectors pointed towards nature and emancipation, which are interlinked, that is — the normativity of the good is always organized by both of them and it is inappropriate to refer to one of them only. This fault is made, the author believes, by Nussbaum who does not offer enough resources to establish a sound naturalistic evaluative standard in her theory. To address this issue the author starts by discussing the capabilities approach as a form of the concept of good and proceeds by analysing Nussbaum’s view on family as an exemplar of the inadequacies of the approach.


Published : 2018-04-26


Machura, P. (2018). Dobro a wolność. Wokół teorii możliwości Marthy Nussbaum. Folia Philosophica, 33. Retrieved from https://www.journals.us.edu.pl/index.php/FOLIA/article/view/6901

Piotr Machura  piotr.machura@us.edu.pl
Uniwersytet Śląski w Katowicach, Wydział Nauk Społecznych, Instytut Filozofii  Poland



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