On Karol Wojtyła’s Aristotelian Method  
Part II  
Induction and Reduction  
as Aristotelian Induction (ἐπαγωγή)  
and Division (διαίρεσις)

Abstract: This is the second of a two-part study treating Karol Wojtyła’s Aristotelian methodology. Having presented Aristotle’s method of induction (ἐπαγωγή/epagoge) and analysis (ἀνάλυσις/analusis) or division (διαίρεσις/diairesis) in Part I, Part II discloses the logical form and force of Wojtyła’s method of induction and reduction as Aristotelian induction and division. Looking primarily to the introduction to The Acting Person, it is shown that Wojtyła utilizes the logical forms of reductio ad impossibile and reasoning on the hypothesis of the end, or effect-cause reasoning, which is special to the life sciences and the power-object model of definition as set down by Aristotle. By use of this Aristotelian methodology, Wojtyła obtains definitive knowledge of the human person that is necessary and undeniable: he discloses the εἶδος (eidos) or species of the person in the Aristotelian, Thomistic, and Phenomenological sense of the term.

Keywords: Karol Wojtyła, method, induction, reduction, Aristotle, definition, division, person, act, philosophical anthropology
Introduction

In his introduction to The Acting Person, Karol Wojtyła sets down and utilizes a philosophical methodology for disclosing the essence of the human person, which he refers to as a two-stage process of induction and reduction. Wojtyła explicitly identifies induction as an Aristotelian method. He does not explicitly identify reduction as Aristotelian methodology, though it will be shown that it is, in fact, the Aristotelian method of division. The goal in what follows is to present Wojtyła’s inductive and reductive methodology, demonstrating that this twofold method is equivalent to Aristotelian induction (ἐπαγωγή/epagoge) and division (διαίρεσις/diairesis), as presented in Part I of this study.

In order to properly disclose Wojtyła’s method, the presentation given here will closely follow the order of the text in the Introduction to The Acting Person. As will become apparent, Wojtyła first sets down his methodology and actually utilizes or practices it to establish his subject (3–14), and then he gives a reflective account of this methodology (14–18). Thus, in the text, we find somewhat

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1 It is unfortunate—and I fear detrimental to the philosophical legacy of Karol Wojtyła—that a good number of scholars have questioned the legitimacy and authenticity of The Acting Person as a work of Karol Wojtyla, taking it as a bad translation of an original Polish text, or as corrupted by edits and redactions from Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, who collaborated with Wojtyla in the production of the text as an English composition. See, for example, Rocco Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II, 117, note 1; Kenneth L. Schmitz, At the Center of the Human Drama: The Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyla/Pope John Paul II, 58–61; and, Miguel Acosta and Adrian J. Reimers Karol Wojtyla’s Personalist Philosophy: Understanding Person and Act (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2016), 9. Acosta goes as far as to recommend that “English-speaking scholars and students, at least at the graduate level of studies, should probably avoid using this translation.” These scholars offer no textual evidence in support of their criticism of The Acting Person. Showing that the text differs from the original Polish work, Osoba i czyn, in the use of Thomistic and Phenomenological terminology, etc., of course, is not evidence that the work is inauthentic, a bad translation, or not in line with Wojtyla’s scholarly and philosophical intentions. There is no need to defend the legitimacy of the work here, which should be understood as a stand-alone, English composition, as Jameson Taylor has already accomplished this task in the manner of a tour de force, in his “The Acting Person in Purgatory: A Note for Readers of the English Text,” in Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture, vol. 13, no. 3 (Summer 2010): 77–104. The published version of The Acting Person states explicitly on its title page that it is the “definitive text of the work established in collaboration with the author by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka,” and Wojtyla’s own preface to the text indicates his support of its publication as a stand-alone work. There is no textual or historical evidence to suggest that the work is not the authentic work of Wojtyla, setting aside gossip and conspiracy theories. Contra the advice of Acosta, scholars and students should continue to study The Acting Person as an English composition and authentic work of Wojtyla, along with the rest of his work.

2 AP, 14.
a circling back and forth between setting out methodology and practicing it \textit{and then} an explicit and reflective logical account of method. This style, perhaps, is one of the reasons that commentators have found the text difficult and confusing, though it is by no means in itself an inherently flawed or unphilosophical approach, and it makes sense in Aristotelian terms, since a method is fitted in accord with an already given subject of theoretical inquiry.\textsuperscript{3} Here, there is now an essential advantage, which will be manifest in the following presentation: we have, in unequivocal terms, an understanding of what induction and division mean in Aristotle, who is their ultimate source, so that we will be able to clearly identify them in systematic fashion as they are presented and utilized by Wojtyla.

Experience (\v{e}μπειρία/emperia) & Induction (\v{e}παγωγή/epagoge)

Immediately taking a cue from Aristotle, Karol Wojtyła commences \textit{The Acting Person} by making the methodological point of departure for his treatment of the human person the “experience of man”:

The inspiration to embark upon this study came from the need to objectivize that great cognitive process which at its origin may be defined as the \textit{experience of man}; this experience, which man has of himself, is the richest and apparently the most complex of all experiences accessible to him. Man’s experience of anything outside of himself is always associated with the experience

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{3} See, for example: Kenneth L. Schmitz, \textit{At the Center of the Human Drama}, 58; and, Jameson Taylor, “The Acting Person in Purgatory: A Note for Readers of the English Text,” 78. The very fact of the extensive commentary work on the methodological approach of Wojtyła in \textit{The Acting Person} is sufficient to show that it is no easy thing to understand. Wojtyła’s approach is in line with that of Aristotle. See, for example, \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, I.3 (1094b11-14). Having set out a general conception of the human good as the subject of the enquiry, Aristotle states: “And our account would be stated sufficiently, if it were shown with clarity in accord with the subject matter (κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην).” The founder of the phenomenological tradition, Edmund Husserl, understands the formulation of method in the same terms. See, \textit{Logical Investigations}, Vol. I, 1, § 11, tr. J.N. Findlay (London: Routledge, 2001): “Sciences are creations of the spirit which are directed to a certain end, and which are for that reason to be judged in accordance with that end. The same holds of theories, validations and in short every thing that we call a ‘method.’ Whether a science is truly a science, or a method a method, depends on whether it accords with the aims that it strives for.” For more on this topic in Husserl, see also, Daniel C. Wagner, “On the Foundational Compatibility of Phenomenology & Thomism.”
of himself, and he never experiences anything external without having at the same time the experience of himself.⁴

By “experience,” then, Wojtyła means a cognitive state of understanding, presupposing concept formation, which generally includes personal awareness of both an internal and external nature. By “experience,” Wojtyła means Aristotelian ἐμπειρία (empeiria), as we have seen Aristotle use the term in Posterior Analytics II.19 and Metaphysics I.1 in Part I of this study. Recall that experience, in the sense of ἐμπειρία (empeiria), means a factual understanding of the world we are aware of, which can be expressed in judgement by the application of concepts formed through sense-perception, memory, and reason or the rational faculty.⁵ As Aristotle expressed in APo II.19 and Metaphysics I.1, experience provides the point of departure for proper knowledge in the technical arts and in theoretical science or philosophy. The move from experiential knowledge to refined technical or theoretical understanding occurs when the knower makes such experiential concepts in relation to the particulars of experience objects of knowledge themselves and seeks by reason to refine them, drawing distinction, so that they express the essential aspects of the particulars that are their referents. Human knowers are capable of this act because human experience is itself already a form of knowledge and understanding, as Wojtyła has stated. The experience of man is a possible object of knowledge precisely because it is itself an act of understanding where I am subject and object, simultaneously.⁶

To put it in the more traditional terms of being as the object of the intellect,⁷ we can say, by way of further explanation, that the being that knows the being of itself and the world can turn by a reflective act of the same faculty and know the experiential concepts by which he experiences the world, because these too are.⁸ What is more, knowing these concepts, he can then seek to refine and develop them in light of the very world itself (this latter, reflective act, being reduction and division, which will be treated in detail presently). According to Wojtyła, then, as human beings, we already have cognitive awareness of ourselves, oth-

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⁴ AP, 3. Emphasis added.
⁵ Wojtyła calls experience a “fact,” in line with the Aristotelian position that ἐμπειρία constitutes basic factual knowledge (τὸ ὅτι/to hoti), at AP, 3.
⁶ AP, 4: “Intimately associated with the relation is the process of comprehension that also has its own distinctive moments and its continuity. Ultimately, our comprehension of ourselves is composed of many separate moments of understanding, somewhat analogous to experience, which is also composed of many distinctive experiences; it thus seems that every experience is also a kind of understanding.”
⁷ See, Aristotle, Metaphysics IV.7 (1011b24-28) and St. Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputates de Veritate, a. 1, response. A debt is owed here to Brian Kemple who, in our discussions pertaining to knowledge, first made me aware of the de Veritate text.
⁸ That Wojtyła mirrors this traditional approach is even more clear, as we will see below, in his treatment of the method of reduction.
ers, and the world, and there is a need to make this experience and the concepts that constitute it an object of knowledge in itself—that is, to “objectivize” this “cognitive process” and define it in rigorous terms. Here, thus, Wojtyła has set down the better-known to us, general datum which we must divide or analyze to gain proper knowledge of the person: the “experience of man.”

In line with Aristotle’s expression that human scientific enquiry moves from a better-known to us, complex, and indistinct sense-perceptive conception of a subject to proper understanding by division (APo I.2 and Physics I.1), Wojtyła explicitly signals that this experience is a general notion composed of many individual moments:

There are in it some vividly expressive moments and also whole, dull sequences, but they all sum up to make the specific totality of experience of that individual man who is myself. The totality is composed of a multitude of experiences and is, as it were, their resultant.9

As Aristotle, then, Wojtyła understands that experience is constituted in the sense-perceptive and cognitive process whereby general conceptions are formed from the particulars (again, APo I.2, II.19, Physics I.1, and Metaphysics I.1). Emphasizing this point, Wojtyła will echo Aristotle’s statement in APo II.19, that the source of knowledge in art and science is “experience or every universal being established in the soul—the one in relation to the many, which one would be the same in all the many particulars.”10 The “universal” and the “one in relation to the many,” of course, is the conceptual meaning. As Wojtyła says,

Undoubtedly every experience is a single event, and its every occurrence is unique and unrepeatable, but even so there is something that, because of a whole sequence of empirical moments, may be called the “experience of man.” The object of experience is the man emerging from all the moments and at the same time present in every one of them (we disregard here all other objects).11

Thus, Wojtyła understands in Aristotelian terms that, after many repeated, individual moments of awareness, one experiential conception is formed—it “emerges” to the intellect from the particulars as it is immanent in them.

In treating “experience and comprehension,” Wojtyła’s Aristotelian position that experience as a knowledge state is constituted by concept formation from sense-perception, memory, and reason, becomes even more manifest. Recall

9 AP, 3.
10 Posterior Analytics, II.19 (100a6-9).
11 AP, 3–4. We note, here, in passing, Wojtyła simultaneous use of the phenomenological method of the epoche, whereby we “disregard all other objects.”
again, that at *APo* II.19, in giving his genetic account of human knowledge, Aristotle had noted that, after sense-perception, memory, and the use of the rational faculty, “the universal/conception” is “established” in the soul. Selecting another English term, with the same Latinate root source as *established*—*stabilio*, meaning “to make firm, steadfast, stable, or fixed”—Wojtyła well describes concept formation after sense-perception as a form of “stabilization.”12 Like Aristotle, he indicates that animals have something of this capacity and experience, though in them it is not with reason or rational, that is, it lacks λόγος (*logos*): “It is in this way that a dog or a horse, for example, recognizes its master from a stranger.”13 He then describes *stabilization* in the case of human concept formation with reason or λόγος (*logos*) in the constitution of experience:

The stabilization of experiential objects peculiar to the human experience is essentially different and is accomplished by mental discrimination and classification. It is owing to this kind of stabilization that the subject’s experience of his own ego is kept within the bounds of the experience of man and that these experiences may be subsequently superimposed on one another.14

Clearly, then, Wojtyła understands the human concept formation constitutive of experience as already rational, allowing for “mental discrimination and classification”—something for which there is no evidence in animal cognitive behavior. *Superimposition*, we must understand, is part of the continued process of the collection and division of universal attributes given in sense-perceptive experience of the particulars. Of course, here, Wojtyła is speaking of the experience of the phenomenon of the human person, and it is worth noting that he is simultaneously utilizing the phenomenological method, as he “disregards” other objects of experience, which is to say he exercises an ἐποχή (*epoche*) with respect to them, placing them out of consideration.

As Aristotle explains in *Physics* I.1, our study of the natural world commences with a better-known to us, general and indistinct sense-perceptive universal and proceeds by analysis and division to express its essential aspects or elements. Similarly, Wojtyła is explicit that “experience” is “the basis of the knowledge of man”15—as just such an indistinct universal:

It becomes clear in our considerations that the need for explaining the meaning of experience in general, and the meaning of the experience of man in particular, is becoming increasingly evident, and we shall have to return to

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12 The Greek term that Aristotle uses is ἠρεμέω (*eremeo*), meaning “to be still, remain, at rest, unmoved, or fixed.”
13 *AP*, 6.
14 *AP*, 6.
15 *AP*, 4.
this point later. In the meanwhile, before proceeding to an explanation of this fundamental concept, we shall sketch in rough outlines the highly complex and intricate cognitive process, which we have here called the “experience of man.”

Indicating the need, then, to give a general outline of his subject genus, Wojtyla turns next to the process of reduction and division.

Reduction as the Reductio form of Aristotelian Division

To begin, this “general,” experiential conception of man with which Wojtyla commences his inquiry includes as distinct and irreducible aspects the self or ego along with other selves or egos, that is, “other men,” and the world and all its objects as given intersubjectively. This fact is given as essential to experience through the phenomena of my interior, outerness, and the “peculiar interior” of other human beings, simultaneously. My interior is constituted by an inner experience itself that is “untransferable by and out of the ego,” while I am aware of the outer world and other, non-transferable egos, through sense-perception and intellect. Wojtyła is emphatic that both inner and outer experi-

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16 AP, 5. The use of the phrase “rough outlines,” here, smacks of Aristotle’s use of the term παχυλῶς to describe the manner of defining a subject in generic terms. See, for example, Nicomachean Ethics, I.3 (1094b19-27). This adverbial from literally means “thickly,” and is often translated “roughly,” though I suggest the term “broadly” in order to avoid the suggestion that the account/definition is lacking any essential generic feature (for Aristotle, this is certainly not the case). See, The Aristotelian Foundations of the Human Good, 344–345. In any case, the point is to indicate that we are engaged in a process of division already, seeking to define our subject-genus.

17 An “aspect” is an essential defining part, which is not itself a whole or the whole to which it belongs. See, AP, 28. In general, this corresponds to the Husserlian notion of a “moment.” Cf. Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology, 23.

18 See, AP, 4: “The experience of man is composed of his experience of himself and of all other men whose position relative to the subject is that of the object of experience, that is to say, who are in a direct cognitive relation to the subject.”

19 AP, 7.

20 AP, 7.

21 See, AP, 7. He notes, here, regarding apprehension of the interior of the other: “While I do not experience this interior directly, I know of it: I know about people in general, and in the case of individuals I may sometimes know very much.” Wojtyla’s approach to intersubjectivity and the problem of other egos, here, though brief, is on very solid ground as it is not unlike...
ence are essential to the whole datum of the experience of the human being. Actually utilizing the Aristotelian method of division, which presently we will see him label reduction, Wojtyła argues that these “aspects” or elements are essential to the experience of man by a form of *reductio ad impossibile*, showing that they cannot be reduced to each other. The inner and outer experience are irreducible, meaning that they must stand—it is impossible for this not to be the case—as essential elements or aspects of experience.

Referring to this general, experiential conception of man including the inner and the outer in relation to intellect and sense-perception, note, then, Wojtyła’s use of the term *impossible*, to indicate such reasoning:

> All this has to be taken note of when considering the experience of man. It is impossible to isolate artificially this experience from the whole range of cognitive acts that have man as their object. It is also impossible to separate it artificially from the intellectual factor. The nature of the whole set of cognitive acts directed at man, both at the man I am and at every man other than myself, is empirical as well as intellectual. The two aspects interpenetrate, interact, and mutually support each other.

Here, his primary point is that we must include both intellectual and empirical, that is, sense-perceptive qualities as essential, and co-permeating aspects of experience of the person as a whole. This, of course, is to reject any mind-body type dualism, idealism, solipsism, and also behaviorism, at the outset. Reflecting on his Aristotelian empirical approach and distinguishing it from phenomenalism, then, Wojtyła identifies this reasoning in dividing the general conception of the experience of man as a form of “argument” and the process of defining “with greater precision.” His reasoning comes in the *reductio* form, the trademark of which, as we know, is the derivation of a contradiction where the principle is supposed to be false in defense of the truth of the principle. Here, he makes this point, showing that it is impossible to reduce experience to sensation alone: “To reduce the range of experience to the functions and the content of sense alone would lead to deep contradictions and serious misunderstandings.”

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22 Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* I.5-7, where Aristotle distinguishes form, privation, and subject, showing that they cannot be reduced to each other, by way of *reductio ad impossibile*.

23 *AP*, 8.

24 See, *AP*, 8. The title of the section is “The Empirical Standpoint Is Not Identifiable with Phenomenalism.” Here, referring back to the division of experience into the inner and outer aspects, he notes: “In the course of the preceding argument, it seemed necessary to define with greater precision the meaning of experience in general in connection with the experience of man.”

There cannot be a phenomenalist, Cartesian divorce of what is given in sense-experience from actual things, as this leads directly to contradiction in the very meaning of sensitive experience—inner and outer—as it is given. Thus, while dividing my inner ego from that of the outer other, and from other objects given in sense-perceptive experience, I yet recognize that these aspects are essential to the whole of experience of man, or I would be contradicting the very meaning of that experience as it has already been given.

In the following section of the Introduction, Wojtyła focuses in on the phenomenologically, or experientially given datum, “man-acts,” which is, as he says, the beginning of his argument for the nature of the person. This concept is a “dynamic totality,” which is to say that it is a universal of awareness better-known to us that is in potential to being divided into its essential elements or aspects. Here, again, having a datum via sense-perceptive experience, Wojtyła utilizes the Aristotelian conception of division by *reductio* to show with necessity that phenomenalism is false:

> It would be *impossible* to accept as true that in grasping this fact experience only reaches to the “surface,” that it would be restricted to a set of sense data, which in every particular case is unique, while the mind is, so to speak, awaiting these data so as to make of them its objects, which it will then call either “action” or “acting person.” On the contrary, it seems that the mind is engaged already in experience itself and that the experience enables it to establish its relation to the object, a relation also, although in a different sense.

Experience cannot be reduced to the sensually perceived aspects in the phenomenon of “man-acts” because the experience “man-acts” already requires the formation of the universal conception (that is what experience is) with the inner or the ego as an essential meaning of “man-acts” when we have the experience of man acting. Thus, to bring out the argument more explicitly, the error and contradiction here would entail that ‘I do have an experience/conceptual mean-

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27 *AP*, 8–9: “An experience is indubitably connected with a range of data which we have as given. One of them is evidently the dynamic totality of ‘man-acts.’ It is this fact that we take as the starting point, and on it we shall primarily concentrate in our argument.”


ing of “man-acts” (P), but I do not have an experience/conceptual meaning of man acts (not P). To experience merely the sensed data of man-acts is not to experience man-acts—it is a contradictory reduction and distortion of the datum. The perceived attributes of person without judgement of person in terms of ego or other does not constitute the experience of man. On this account, it is non-sensical (as it results in this contradiction), to reduce the meaning of man acts to mere particulars of sense experience as though man acting is merely some material mechanistic reality (again, that would contradict the sense of “man-acting” as I know it in experience). Therefore, to have an experience of “man-acts” is not merely to experience perceivable movement, etc., but it also includes experience of the person as the cognitive, conscious, or knowing agent of the actions.30 This reasoning allows Wojtyła to distinguish his phenomenological approach, where there is a “unity of acts of human cognition,” from the phenomenalist approach, upholding sense-perceptive and cognitive acts as distinct, but essential aspects of the phenomenon.

Expressing the unity of experience along these lines, Wojtyła immediately indicates the need for further exploration of this datum by the process of division, or the second sense of Aristotelian induction:

For our position is that action serves as a particular moment of apprehending—that is, of experiencing—the person. This experience is, of course, inherently connected with a strictly defined understanding, which consists, as already mentioned, in an intellectual apprehension grounded on the fact that man acts in innumerable recurrences. The datum “man-acts,” with its full experiential content, now opens itself for exfoliation as a person’s action.31 Here, showing his originality and philosophical insight, Wojtyła draws a brilliant analogy between the process of division and exfoliation. In English, exfoliation is a process of separating layers that rest on or adhere to each other. The term is from the Latin verb, exfoliare literally meaning “out of/from-leafing,” folio meaning “leaf.” Thus, we are to understand that the experience, “man-acts,” is an object with many layers or leaves, interconnected and adhering to each other, which are in need of exfoliation, which just is division in the Aristotelian sense. “It is only in this way,” Wojtyła notes, “that the whole content of experience reveals the fact with characteristic manifestness.”32 Wojtyła immediately defines the meaning of “manifest,” as a kind of intellectual seeing, presentation, or visualization, which we also know as the moment after Aristotelian induc-

30 Again, this is because human experience as a whole is permeated by the act of conscious understanding: “Thus in every human experience there is also a certain measure of understanding of what is experienced.”
31 AP, 10. Emphasis added.
32 AP, 10.
tion called νοῦς (nous) or intellectual-judgement. In this act of manifestation, Wojtyła notes,

[…] the interpretation of the fact that “man-acts,” in terms of the person’s action—or rather in terms of the acting-person’s totality—finds full confirmation in the content of experience, that is, in the content of the datum “man-acts” in its innumerable recurrences. 33

Here, he is describing how, after beginning with general experience and then refining it by division, we confirm the leaves or elements divided by returning to the original datum itself for verification. This is the process of inductive division in Aristotle. Describing the method “more accurately,” he then states:

Indeed, the interpretation of the fact of man’s acting in terms of the dynamic person-action conjunction is fully confirmed in experience. Neither is there anything in experience that would be opposed to this interpretation when the fact that “man-acts” is objectivized in terms of a person’s action is confirmed. 34

Wojtyła has identified “man-acts” as the fact and experiential point of departure of The Acting Person, utilizing Aristotelian induction in the first sense. He has used Aristotelian induction in the second sense of division, employing the *reductio* to show the necessity of the meaning the “experience of man,” as including empirical and cognitive or intellectual aspects. A universal conceptual meaning is apprehended from the particulars, and its validity is then verified in and by the particulars themselves in an act of intellectual-judgment. This is what Wojtyła means by “confirmation.” It is absurd and a lack of education to ask if this concept is valid in the sense of signifying a real subject of inquiry. This fact is known inductively in the perceptive, intellectual-judgement itself, wherein the human act discloses itself time and time again in confirmation of the experiential concept of the person. In fact, this is the same reasoning that Aristotle provides, in Physics II.1, having defined nature, in response to those who would ask for a demonstration that nature exists. 35 Just as the meaning of

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33 AP, 10.
34 AP, 10
35 Physics, II.1 (193a3-8): ὡς δ’ ἐστιν ἢ φύσις, πειράσθαι δεικνύναι γελοίον· φανερόν γάρ ὅτι τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἐστίν πολλά. τὸ δὲ δεικνύναι τὰ φανερὰ διὰ τῶν ἀφανῶν οὐ δυναμένου κρίνειν ἐστὶ τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ δ’ αὐτὸ γνώριμον (ὅτι δ’ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο πάσχειν, οὐκ ἄδηλον· συλλογίσαιτο γὰρ ἃ ἐκ τῆς πάντως ὄντων τοῦ εἰσαγόμενον τῆς κατὰ τὰ ποταμὸν κατεστημέναν αὐτῷ τίποτε τῶν ἀποκριθῶν ἡμών, νοεῖν δὲ μὴ μηδέν. In the first line, ὡς is equivalent to ὅτι. Or, “But to attempt to demonstrate (δεικνύναι) that nature is, is absurd; for it is manifest (φανερὸν) that (ὅτι) there are many such things among existing things (τῶν ὄντων). And to [try to] show manifest things through things not manifest belongs to one who is not able to discern that which is known on account of itself from that which is not known on account of itself (and that suffe-
nature is necessary because the particulars are as they are, so too “person-act” is a valid subject matter as it is confirmed in the particulars of sense-perceptive experience. Like Aristotle, thus, Wojtyła lets particulars of experience regulate and become the measure of refined theoretical conception.

Reduction as Power-Object Division, Effect-Cause and Suppositional Reasoning

Beginning with “person-act” as fundamental datum of experience, Wojtyła next expresses his intention to utilize the third form of Aristotelian inductive division: the method of division constituted by effect to cause reasoning, where the actions of the particulars being studied are taken as the point of departure for apprehending their essential nature. Here, then, we have the method of beginning from τά ἔργα (ta erga) taken as effects that Aristotle set it down in De Anima and De Partibus Animalium:

The title itself of this book, The Acting Person, shows it is not a discourse on action in which the person is presupposed. We have followed a different line of experience and understanding. For us action reveals the person, and we look at the person through his action. For it lies in the nature of the correlation inherent in experience, in the very nature of man’s acting, that action constitutes the specific moment whereby the person is revealed. Action gives us the best insight into the inherent essence of the person and allows us to understand the person most fully. We experience man as a person, and we are convinced of it because he performs actions.36

Establishing that value in the ethical sense is an essential aspect of the phenomenon of the act of the person,37 Wojtyła restates this methodology, this time

36 AP, 11. Here, Wojtyła contrasts his approach to a traditional approach in ethics, which assumes the person. It is of great import to note that Aristotle uses this same methodology in the philosophical anthropology that he gives in Nicomachean Ethics I. See, again, Daniel C. Wagner, The Aristotelian Foundations of the Human Good. Below, at 14, using the phenomenological method, he will use the epoche again to set aside considerations about the good.

37 AP, 11–12. Here, Wojtyła refers to Nicomachean Ethics as inspirational. Of course, he will yet use the epoche to suspend judgement about the value of action, per se, in this work, fo-
explicitly identifying it with exfoliation which, as we have seen, is his technical term for division:

This book is not a study in ethics. The person is not presupposed, is not implied in it; on the contrary, all our attention is centered on possibly the most comprehensive explanation of that reality which is the person. The source of our knowledge of the reality that is the person lies in action, but even more so in the dynamic or existential aspects of morality. In this approach we shall rely on the real objective unity of the experience of moral value and the experience of man, rather than try to retain the traditional lines of anthropology with ethics. This is the fundamental condition of exfoliating and then progressively comprehending the person.  

As we saw Aristotle explain and utilize it in both *De Anima* and *De Partibus Animalium*, then, Wojtyła will utilize the power-object model of division, beginning with the apprehension of act or ἔργον (ergon) of the human being in experience taken as an effect, and then culminating by the reasoning to the essence and capacity required in the nature of the person as the source of the act. Looking forward to the content of *The Acting Person* to follow, this method of exfoliation is most important. As he does not explain it in further detail in his Introduction, which remains at a high level of abstraction in its discussion of exfoliation, pause is warranted here for further explanation and connection to the Aristotelian method.

Wojtyła’s approach to consciousness and self-knowledge as essential and essentially related aspects of the person-act phenomenon provides an excellent example of his use of both the *reductio* style and the power-object model of division. First, Wojtyła distinguishes consciousness from intentional, cognitive objectivization. Consciousness, as distinct from cognition of objects of experience and self, is a reflective or “mirroring” function that is “the understanding of what has been constituted and comprehended,” so that it is a kind of awareness presupposing intentional knowing acts, or cognitive subject-object relations. That consciousness is necessarily distinct from intentional cognitive acts of the person is shown by inductive reasoning with a necessity of constraint, with reference to the experience of person-act: to deny this distinction is contrary to the very sense of the experience of person-act, as we find in that datum particulars corresponding not only to cognitive action but also, and even in and with the cognitive action, the conscious mirroring function. Wojtyła further argues by *reductio* that it is impossible to sever the mirroring

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38 AP, 13.
39 AP, 32.
functioning of consciousness from self-knowledge, because it presupposes it and the content it provides in its action. Finally, in further disclosing the dynamic powers of self-knowledge in relation to consciousness, Wojtyła utilizes the suppositional form of reasoning in conjunction with the power-object model. First, he identifies the capacity or power in relation to an object. Here, the couple is self-knowledge-consciousness:

[...] the objectivizing turn of self-knowledge toward the ego and toward the actions related to the ego is also a turn to consciousness as such, so far as consciousness also becomes the object of self-knowledge.

Having set out the power and the object in this manner, Wojtyła next uses suppositional reasoning to show why it is necessary, fitting, or best that this power and object be connected in this manner:

This explains why, when man is conscious of his acting, he also knows he is acting: indeed, he knows he is acting consciously. He is aware of being conscious and of acting consciously. Self-knowledge has as its object no only the person and the action, but also the person as being aware of himself and aware of his action.

Recall, first, that the Aristotelian conception of reasoning on the hypothesis or supposition of the end is properly causally explanatory. On the supposition that there is to be such and such a form of normative behavior, for example, marsh-dwelling, it is necessary that such and such morphology be present. The end, that is the functional life activities of the organism, explain why it is that it possess the morphological capacities that it possess. Here, using the term “explain” appropriately, then, we can see Wojtyła reasoning in just this manner: on the supposition of the end or effect that the person is to know himself as acting, it is necessary that consciousness is also the object of the power of self-knowledge. Thus, having first divided these aspects of the experience of person-act by division by division by *reductio*, Wojtyła has now connected them in the power-object relation by hypothetical reasoning, which is also a cause-effect reasoning.

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40 *AP*, 36: “Because of self-knowledge consciousness can mirror actions and their relations to the ego. Without it consciousness would be deprived of its immanent meanings so far as man’s self is concerned—when it presents itself as the object—and would then exist as if it were suspended in the void.” This hypothetical is an absurdity, which Wojtyła attributes to the “idealists.”

41 In Aristotelian terms, this is an example of moving from knowledge of the fact of the division of attributes, to knowledge of the cause of the fact.

42 While I have chosen these examples because they come early in the text, and because of the clarity with which they are given, we rightly expect Wojtyła to utilize the Aristotelian me-
Wojtyła’s Method: Beginning Again

Wojtyła’s propaedeutic treatment of methodology now hits its crescendo, in Section Three of the Introduction to *The Acting Person*, on the “stages of comprehending and the lines of interpretation.” At this point, having stated his method and utilized it to set out his generic subject matter, Wojtyła circles back to give a reflective account of the logical method of *The Acting Person*. Here, immediately treating “induction and the unity of meaning,” and referring to his prior presentation of “experience” and “stabilization,” Wojtyła explicitly identifies the method of the text with Aristotelian sense-perceptive induction:

The transition from the multiplicity and complexity of “factual” data to the grasping of their essential sameness, previously defined as the stabilization of the object of experience, is achieved by induction. At any rate this is how Aristotle seems to have understood the inductive function of the mind. This view is not shared by modern positivists, such as J.S. Mill, for whom induction is already a form of argumentation or reasoning—something which it is not for Aristotle. Induction consists in grasping mentally the unity of meaning from among the multiplicity and complexity of phenomena. In connection with our earlier assertions, we may say that induction leads to that simplicity in the experience of man which we find in it in spite of all its complexity.43

It is clear that for Wojtyła, the term *induction* in Aristotle is limited to the sense of concept formation and intellectual-judgement, prior to the forms of reasoning used in division proper. The fact that Wojtyła does not include the reasoned process of division by *reductio* or the power-object model, as Aristotle does, is merely a semantic difference. He will understand these latter senses of Aristotelian, reasoned induction as division, as his own “reduction.” Both induction and reduction, then, in the senses that Wojtyła utilizes them, are Aristotelian. This fact becomes more clear in his explicit treatment of the terms, to which we now return.

Wojtyła explains that induction is the process of concept formation, whereby a sameness and unity of meaning is formed in the understanding following on sense-perception of the manifold of particulars. In this case, the key unity or *one form the many* is that of the person-action relation.44 Here, in Wojtyła, we can see the description of concept formation and formation of the universal that Aristotle calls the beginning of knowledge in art and science, in *APo* II.19:

43 *AP*, 14.
44 *AP*, 14. “Sameness is understood here as equivalent to the “unity of meaning.”
The whole wealth and diversity of “factual” data accumulated from individual details is retained in experience, while the mind disengages from their abundance and grasps only the unity of meaning.\footnote{AP, 14.}

Wojtyła is careful to ensure that, in treating the constitution of experience by concept formation and induction, we do not commit the error of abstraction:

In order to grasp this unity the mind, so to speak, allows experience to predominate without, however, ceasing to understand the wealth and diversity of experience. The grasping by the mind of the unity of meaning is not equivalent to a rejection of experiential wealth and diversity (though sometimes this is how the function of abstraction is erroneously interpreted). While comprehending (say) the acting person on the ground of the experience of man, of all the “factual” data of “man-acts,” the mind still remains attentive in this essential understanding to the wealth of diverse information supplied by experience.\footnote{AP, 15.}

It is clear, once again, that Wojtyła appropriates and utilizes the first sense of induction, that is, the induction of sense-perception, as first formulated by Aristotle. As we know, however, this is the source—the ἀρχή—of refined scientific, or theoretical knowledge. Having set out this realist-empiricist point of departure, Wojtyła presents the method of reduction, which is Aristotelian division.

In the next section, explaining that “reduction allows us to explore the experience of man,” Wojtyła helpfully distinguishes the division and refinement sense of induction as “reduction.” As he says: “Induction opens the way to reduction.”\footnote{AP, 14.} Etymologically speaking, the term “reduction” provides a fitting name for induction as division and analysis, and Aristotle would be pleased with the terminological nuance. As indicated in Part I of this study, in the Greek and Latin, both ἐπαγωγή (epagoge) and inductio mean a “leading into.” Thus, “reduction” signifies a second stage of “leading into” after the first stage is complete—a “re-leading into.” First, as we have seen, starting from sense-perception and a grasp of the particulars, induction is the leading into the formation, establishment, or stabilization of a “unity of meaning,” that is, a concept by which the particulars can be judged constituting experience. However, once we have this concept and we make it an object of the intellect itself in relation to what it signifies, we can preform a “reduction,” refining it by division, making judgements as to its essential elements or aspects through eliminative, hypothetical, and power-object style reasoning, and by the experimentative comparison of it back to what it signifies. This is why Wojtyla speaks at the very outset of the
need to “objectivize” the phenomenon of the person. Thus, we are engaged in a *reduction*, or a re-leading-into the formation of a higher order, refined concept or universal of the human person. So, says Wojtyła:

> It is precisely the need for examining, explaining, or interpreting the rich reality of the person, which is given together with and through actions in the experience of man, that has inspired this study. Thus, we think it a waste of time to demonstrate or prove that man is a person and his acting is “action.” We assume these to be irreducibly given in the experience itself of man’s acting. Nevertheless, it is necessary to explain in detail the various aspects of the reality of the acting person on the ground of a fundamental understanding of person and action.\(^{48}\)

Here, then, is an initial statement of the method of division as Aristotle sets it out at *Physics* II.1: in order to know the essence of the person, we begin with our better-known, general experiential concept of the person-act, and we divide it into its aspects. That Wojtyła understands this process of reduction as analysis and division—that these terms are synonymous—becomes immediately apparent:

> It is by an analytic argument and reductive understanding that experience is explored.\(^{49}\)

As with Aristotle, who holds that division leads to actual understanding unlocking the meaning of the whole by disclosure of its essential elements, Wojtyła is careful to distinguish his sense of “reduction” from reductionism, which eliminates essential aspects of the whole being studied:

> We have to remember, however, the correct meaning of the term “reductive,” which does not indicate here any reduction in the sense of diminishing or limiting the wealth of the experiential object. On the contrary, our aim is to bring it out more fully. The exploration of the experience of man ought to be a cognitive process in which the original apprehension of the person in and through his actions is continuously and homogenetically developed. At the same time, this first apprehension has to be enriched and consistently extended and deepened.\(^{50}\)

Like Aristotle, who begins in his studies of natural being with a better-known to us, indistinct universal and proceeds to divide it in a manner that remains true to the whole that is being defined in relation to the particulars, so also Wojtyła’s approach works in an analytic and “non-reductive” (in a Cartesian sense) manner.

\(^{48}\) *AP*, 14.

\(^{49}\) *AP*, 16. Emphasis added.

\(^{50}\) *AP*, 16.
Wojtyła proceeds to add further clarity along these lines, emphasizing that reduction and interpretation have as their point of departure for the study of person the general experiential conception “issuing from human praxis,” which already includes a non-Cartesian intersubjective aspect. After induction has occurred, an experiential concept of the person-act phenomenon being formed as a “factual datum,” we can then inquire theoretically, via reduction as exfoliation or division, into the nature of this datum—it becomes, in Aristotelian terms, a *problem* for us in our apprehension and judgement of its being:

Induction, however, makes of it a problem for and a subject of reflection, and it is then that it comes within the scope of theoretical considerations. For being an experience, that is to say, an experiential factual instance, the person-action relation is also partaking of what in traditional philosophy was called “praxis.” It is accompanied by that practical understanding which is necessary and sufficient for a man to live and to act consciously.

We must understand, then, that the rigorous philosophical object of *The Acting Person* is not to somehow justify, prove, or validate in some manner this basic experiential conception of the person-act relation along with aspects of value and intersubjectivity. Again, it is not reasonable to reject the basic meaning of this experience along Cartesian or phenomenalist lines of argument, because induction confirms this experiential conception whereas it actually shows the alternative reductionistic approaches to be false. Given the existence of this datum of experience, following the Aristotelian method of definition that we saw set out in *APo* II.1, the question of *The Acting Person* is not “how the person acts consciously, etc.,” but “what is conscious action and the person as its source.” So, says Wojtyła:

The line of understanding and interpretation that we have chosen here leads through a theoretical treatment of this praxis. The question thus facing us is not how to act consciously but what conscious acting or action really is, how the action reveals the person and how it helps us to gain a full and comprehensive understanding of the person.

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51 *AP*, 16.
52 Aristotle, *Topics*, I.4 (101b15-16): γίνονται μὲν γὰρ οἱ λόγοι ἐκ τῶν προτάσεων· περὶ ζῶν δὲ οἱ συλλογισμοί, τὰ προβλήματα ἐστί. Or, “For rational discourses (οἱ λόγοι) come to be from premises; and, the syllogisms concerning these are the problems (τὰ προβλήματα).”
53 *AP*, 16.
54 *AP*, 16. Reductionistic, dualist, and solipsistic philosophies that call into question the basic experience of the acting person, the world, and the intersubjective relation of acting persons are incoherent precisely because they contradict the very sense of experience that is presupposed to the question or problem they set out to answer. The question or problem, as Husserl rightly identified it, as that of the relation of knower to known object. Without already having a lived expe-
Setting proper parameters for the philosophical inquiry of *The Acting Person* in this manner, Wojtyła proceeds to express the nature of reduction as a form of reasoning, along with the logical force of understanding that he intends it to achieve. First, and again emphasizing his non-reductionist approach, Wojtyła tells us that reduction is process of reasoning:

The term reduction, as here used, has no limiting or diminishing implications: to “reduce” means to convert to suitable arguments and items of evidence or, in other words, to reason, explain, and interpret.55

As with the Aristotelian process of division and analysis, thus, Wojtyła understands reduction as a form of reflective arguments, explanation, and interpretations making what is indistinct about the experiential conception of the person distinct. He expresses explicitly that reduction takes concepts of experience as given, and “works” on them as its subject:

When reasoning and explaining we advance step by step to trace the object that is given us in experience and which directs our progress by the manner in which it is given.56

This is a description, then, of critically examining the concept of experience by relating it back to the object it signifies. This critical act of reasoning, that is a form of comparison and judgment of essential and non-essential elements in the universal, is division and the process of defining the object of knowledge. It is “seeking for evidence and adequate arguments to explain fully and comprehensively the reality of person and action.”57 In this manner, it also becomes clear that reduction is both a part of experience and that it transcends it. It is a part of experience because, after one engages in it, it too is given as an experiential datum. On the other hand, it transcends experience precisely because, as we have seen, it makes experience the object of its rational reflection and reasoning which are exfoliation and division.58 Indicating the Aristotelian aim in experience of acting persons and their intersubjective relation, however, one could not even question how it is that mind is related to body, world, and other persons. Thus, any position that seeks to deny this sense of experience is, from the outset, engaged in a pernicious contradiction and untenable. I have made similar argument in defense of sense-realism, in general, in my article, “The Logical Terms of Sense Realism: A Thomistic-Aristotelian & Phenomenological Defense.”

55 *AP*, 17.
56 *AP*, 17.
57 *AP*, 17.
58 *AP*, 17; “Thus also reduction, and not only induction, is an inherent factor of experience without at the same time ceasing to be, though different from induction, transcendent with respect to it.” And, “Generally speaking, understanding is intrinsic to human experience but also transcends it, not only because experience is an act and process, the nature of which is sensuous
scientific inquiry of moving by division from experience as what is better-know to us to what is better-known in itself or by nature, Wojtyła then expresses the goal of reduction as interpretation:

The aim of interpretation is to produce an intentional image of the object, an image that is adequate and coincident with the object itself.\(^{59}\)

Of course, producing a definition that properly captures the essence of the object being studied is no easy task. The primary error that must be avoided, Wojtyła emphasizes, is any form of reductionism that begins with erroneous principles and results in the exclusion of essential aspects of the experience of “person-act.” Thus, Wojtyła emphasizes that reduction as a method is reflectively holistic, seeking to give an account of the whole nature of the person beginning with act of the person.\(^{60}\) Having the experiential concept of “person-act” as a datum, we turn on it and seek to exfoliate it—to divide it into its essential aspect or element, being careful not to exclude anything essential. Wojtyła makes this point, explicitly showing that reduction is analysis and exfoliation:

Once the problem is put in these terms, it immediately becomes evident that the analyses in this study are not going to be conducted on the level of consciousness alone, though they will necessarily include also the aspect of consciousness. If action is, as already mentioned, the special moment of revealing the person, then naturally we are concerned not with action as the intentional content constituted in consciousness, but instead with that dynamic reality itself which simultaneously reveals the person as its efficacious subject. It is in this sense that in our analyses we will consider action; and it is in this sense that we intend to exfoliate the person through action.\(^{61}\)

Consciousness, of course, is special essential aspect of the acting-person phenomenon because the human act always arises through consciousness. So, Wojtyła immediately qualifies:

At the same time, however, we must keep clearly in mind that action as the moment of the special apprehension of the person always manifests itself through consciousness—as does the person, whose essence the action discloses in a specific manner on the ground of the experience of man, particularly the inner experience.\(^{62}\)

while the nature of understanding and interpretation is intellectual, but because of the intrinsic nature of one and the other. To experience is one thing and to understand and interpret (which implies understanding) is quite another.”

\(^{59}\) AP, 17.
\(^{60}\) AP, 18–19. In this context, Wojtyla single’s out behaviorism.
\(^{62}\) AP, 20.
Accordingly, Wojtyła will commence *The Acting Person*, in chapter 1, with reductive, exfoliating, and division of the aspect of consciousness. Utilizing the method of exfoliation, he tells us here in the introduction, the goal of *The Acting Person* is to examine “consciousness and what constitutes the essence of the dynamism pertaining to man’s action.”63 Concluding his Introduction, Wojtyła concisely states for us the method and its goal, of which we have been seeking an understanding:

*[The Acting Person is] an essay in analysis aimed at developing a synthetic expression for the conception of person and action. The essence of this conception has for its prime objective the understanding of the human person for the sake of the person himself; it is thus designed to respond to the challenge that is posed by the experience of man as well as by the existential problems of man in the contemporary world.*64

Wojtyła, thus, will utilize the Aristotelian method of induction and division, or induction and reduction as exfoliation, to place it in his terms, to obtain a proper definition of the human person. This philosophical anthropology, achieving logical necessity in disclosing the essence of the person, in turn, will provide the foundation for ethics proper. The stakes cannot be higher and the method provided is sufficient to ensure success.

**Conclusion**

This two part-study has shown that Karol Wojtyła’s methodology of *induction* and *reduction*, in *The Acting Person*, is equivalent to Aristotle’s method of induction (ἐπαγωγή/epagoge) and division (διαίρεσις/diairesis) or analysis (ἀνάλυσις/analusis). Like Aristotle, Wojtyła uses a threefold method of division, achieving logical necessity at each stage in disclosing the essence of the person. First, he employs the induction of sense-perception beginning with concept formation and culminating in state of experience. A necessity of constraint pertains to this form of induction, which constitutes the first reasoning act of the mind by *reductio ad impossibile*. Denying the meanings of concepts of experience results in manifest contradiction of the sense or meaning of “experience” itself. While reasonable puzzles and questions arise after reflection on experience, it can never be reasonable to reject Wojtyła’s Thomist, Aristotelian, and phe-

63 *AP*, 20.
64 *AP*, 22.
nomenological realist interpretation of experience. Attempts to do so contradict themselves in presupposing the very thing they seek to undermine, that is, experience. Second, Wojtyła employs reduction as the division into kinds, which also accomplishes its goal by the *reductio* form of argument, showing that the truth of a definition is necessary. Third, in order to define the essence of the human person—a kind of living being—he employs the power-object model of division, which is also a form of effect to cause reasoning. In this manner he is able to achieve explanatory understanding of what is being defined by reasoning on the hypothesis/condition/supposition of the end, which is the *act*, to the necessity of the essential features, capacities, or dynamisms of the person. Thus, this Aristotelian methodology will allow Wojtyła to obtain a refined, better known-to-nature conception of the essence of the human person, that is, the *εἶδος/eidos* or *species* in the Aristotelian, Thomistic, and Phenomenological sense, which is necessarily true in accord with the Aristotelian canons of the principles of science set down in *APo* I.2. In this manner, this study has sought to contribute to scholarly studies of the philosophical thought of Karol Wojtyła, showing in precise textual terms the intelligibility of his methodology. The hope is that the full force of the logical necessity present in the account of the person given in *The Acting Person* will be appreciated. Using such a methodology, the philosophical anthropology of St. Pope John Paul II the Great stands on firm and undeniable ground, providing the foundational principles for ethics as a proper science in the Aristotelian sense.⁶⁵

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⁶⁵ An extension of this study further showing the relation and compatability of Wojtyla’s phenomenological and Aristotelian methodology is already apparent. Having shown that *reduction* is Aristotelian division, an identity between *eidetic* analysis and *reduction* suggests itself. This topic will have to be taken up in another study.
Translations of Plato Consulted


Primary Texts of Aristotle (Greek)


Translations of Aristotle Consulted


Primary Medieval Sources


Secondary Sources


Daniel C. Wagner

**Sur la méthode aristotélicienne de Karol Wojtyła**

**Partie II. Induction et réduction comme induction aristotélicienne (ἐπαγωγή) et division (διαίρεσις)**

**Résumé**

Ce texte constitue la deuxième partie de l’analyse consacrée à la méthode aristotélicienne de Karol Wojtyła. Après la présentation de la méthode aristotélicienne d’induction (ἐπαγωγή / epagoge) et d’analyse (ινάλοςις / analusis) ou de division (διαίρεσις / diairesis) dans la partie I, la partie II démontre la forme logique et l’élan de la méthode d’induction et de réduction de Wojtyła comme induction aristotélicienne et division. En se basant principalement sur l’introduction de *La personne et l’acte*, l’auteur de cette étude utilise les formes logiques de *reductio ad impossible*...
et d’inférence provenant de l’hypothèse finale, ou bien d’inférence résultat-cause, caractéristique des sciences naturelles, et aussi de modèle de la définition du type puissance-objet développée par Aristote. Grâce à cette méthodologie, Wojtyła obtient une connaissance décisive de la personne humaine, connaissance nécessaire et indéniable : elle révèle εἶδος (eidos) ou les types de personnes au sens aristotélicien, thomiste et phénoménologique du concept.

Mots-clés: Karol Wojtyła, méthode, induction, réduction, Aristote, définition, division, personne, acte, anthropologie philosophique.

Daniel C. Wagner

Sul metodo aristotelico di Karol Wojtyła
Seconda parte. Induzione e riduzione come induzione aristotelica (ἐπαγωγή) e divisione (διαίρεσις)

Sommario

Il presente testo costituisce la seconda parte dell’analisi dedicata al metodo aristotelico di Karol Wojtyła. Dopo la presentazione del metodo aristotelico di induzione (ἐπαγωγή / epagoge) e di analisi (ἀνάλυσις / analusis) o di divisione (διαίρεσις / diairesis) nella parte I, la parte II dimostra la forma logica e lo slancio del metodo di induzione e di riduzione di Wojtyła in quanto induzione e divisione aristoteliche. Basandosi principalmente sull’introduzione dell’opera La persona e l’atto, l’autore di questo studio utilizza le forme logiche di reductio ad impossibile e di inferenza provenienti dall’ipotesi finale, o quelle di inferenza causa-risultato, caratteristica delle scienze naturali, e anche quelle di modello della definizione tipo potere-oggetto sviluppata da Aristotele. Grazie a questa metodologia, Wojtyła ottiene una conoscenza decisiva della persona umana, conoscenza necessaria e innegabile, la quale rivela εἶδος (eidos) ovvero i tipi di persone nel senso aristotelico, tomista e fenomenologico del concetto.

Parole chiave: Karol Wojtyła, metodo, induzione, riduzione, Aristotele, definizione, divisione, persona, atto, antropologia filosofica.